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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY BENEFIT-COST
ANALYSIS
Caroline Cecot* & W. Kip Viseusi*"
INTRODUCTION
[When an agency decides to rely on a cost-benefit analysis as part of its rulemaking, a seri-
ous flaw undermining that analysis can render the rule unreasonable.1
However, we would be reluctant to seize upon a single apparently erroneous datum in a very
complex rulemaking and announce that the error undermines the entire rule .... 2
Under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), federal courts have
an obligation to set aside an agency action that is "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."3 In essence,
the APA tasks courts with ensuring that federal agency action is reasona-
ble-or rather, that agencies base their actions on relevant and reliable data
and articulate a rational connection between the evidence and their actions.4
As more agencies use benefit-cost analysis ("BCA") to justify their rule-
makings, a court's duty to ensure that an agency's action is reasonable often
requires the judges to evaluate the reasonableness of agency BCAs.
Since 1981, federal agencies have been required to conduct BCA as
part of a regulatory impact analysis for all significant regulatory actions
pursuant to executive order.' BCA is a decision-making tool that allows
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I Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. EPA, 682 F.3d 1032, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
2 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Herrington, 768 F.2d 1355, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
3 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). Most federal circuits view judicial review under the substantial
evidence test as essentially the same as the review under the arbitrary or capricious test. See infra Part
III.A.
4 Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 105 (1983); Motor Vehi-
cle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
5 Although previous presidents required some assessment of costs of proposed regulatory actions,
President Reagan first formalized this requirement in Executive Order 12,291. Exec. Order No. 12,291,
46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,193-94 (Feb. 19, 1981). This executive order was replaced by President Clin-
ton's Executive Order 12,866, which modified some of the requirements slightly. Exec. Order No.
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regulators to identify welfare-maximizing policies by considering the ex-
pected benefits and costs of the policies if implemented.6 BCA forces regu-
lators to explicitly list, quantify, and, when possible, monetize the expected
benefits and costs of various regulatory alternatives and then pick the regu-
latory alternative that maximizes net benefits, subject to statutory con-
straints.7 In this way, government agencies can prioritize regulatory inter-
ventions and promulgate regulations that produce the greatest net benefits
for society when their statutory mandates allow them to do so. Though not
without controversy, BCA serves as the analytical framework for the design
and evaluation of modem federal regulatory policy.8
Because BCA is prevalent in the agency context-whether the agency
relies on the BCA or not-courts are increasingly being asked to review the
agency's use of BCA either directly or indirectly in the context of review-
ing the agency's decision making. In many respects, the potential scope of
this judicial review is similar to that of the review undertaken by the U.S.
Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") as part of the regulatory over-
sight process.9 However, unlike the OMB review procedure, in which OMB
approval of the regulation is required before a regulation can be issued,
there is no comparable requirement for judicial review and approval of reg-
ulations. Rather there must be some legal challenge involving the. regulation
and its BCA to trigger a judicial review.
The challenges that require a reviewing court to evaluate an agency's
use of BCA come in three general varieties. First, the reviewing court may
be asked to determine whether the agency was authorized to rely on a BCA
given its statutory mandate. ° Or, instead, the court may have to determine
whether the agency was statutorily obligated to employ BCA to justify its
rulemaking." In this context, the reviewing court examines the agency's
statutory mandate and determines the role that BCA is allowed or required
to play in the agency's decision making, employing guidance from the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Second, a reviewing court may have to evaluate the adequacy of an
agency's BCA in light of the agency's statutory mandate. These challenges
12,866,58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). President Obama supplemented President Clinton's
executive order in 2011. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011). A significant
regulatory action is defined as one that is likely to result in a rule that has an annual effect on the econ-
omy of $100 million or more or raises novel legal or policy issues, among other things. Exec. Order No.
12,866,58 Fed. Reg. at 51,738.
6 For a detailed description of BCA and its philosophical origins as a decision procedure, see
MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 1 (2006).
7 Id. at 2.
8 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION, at
xi (2002).
9 Exec. Order No. 12,291,46 Fed. Reg, 13,193, 13,196-98 (Feb. 19, 1981).
10 E.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 462 (2001).
11 E.g., Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 494 (1981).
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to the quality of the agency's BCA often revolve around whether the agen-
cy sufficiently considered all reasonable-or statutorily mandated-factors
in its BCA. 12 The court may also review the underlying assumptions or
methodology in the BCA, including the agency's choice of model for a
particular phenomenon 3 or choice of the discount rate when evaluating
future costs or benefits.'4 The court may also analyze whether the agency
provided sufficient explanation of the BCA's scope or methodology to pro-
vide adequate opportunity for notice and comment and substantive judicial
review.'5
Finally, a reviewing court may use an agency's BCA to evaluate the
agency's regulation even where the agency did not rely on the BCA or take
into account the implications of the BCA in its policy decision. These are
not direct challenges to the BCA, but the BCA is indirectly implicated as
relevant evidence that was before the agency when the agency made the
challenged decision. BCA is often performed pursuant to executive order
and becomes part of the administrative record even when the agency choos-
es not to rely on it.'6 The reviewing court may highlight aspects of the BCA
to either support the ultimate agency decision 7 or cast doubt on the agen-
cy's reasoning and arguments. 8
This Article evaluates judicial review of agency BCA by examining a
substantial sample of thirty-eight judicial decisions on agency actions that
implicate BCA. Some scholars have discussed the desirability of judicial
review of BCA, 9 but few have closely evaluated how courts generally re-
view these BCAs aside from discussing isolated examples.2" This Article
fills this gap in the literature by providing an overview and a critical as-
sessment of how courts evaluate BCAs, as well as the implications of judi-
cial review of BCAs for future regulatory policy.
12 E.g., Pub. Citizen v. FMCSA, 374 F.3d 1209, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
13 E.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1218-19 (5th Cir. 1991).
14 E.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Herrington, 768 F.2d 1355, 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
15 E.g., Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n v. FMCSA, 494 F.3d 188, 202-03 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
16 E.g., Nat'l Truck Equip. Ass'n v. NHTSA, 711 F.3d 662, 670 (6th Cir. 2013); R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1220-21 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v.
USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
17 E.g., Nat'l Truck Equip. Ass'n, 711 F.3d at 670.
18 E.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1220-21.
19 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at xi; Michael Abramowicz, Toward a Jurisprudence of
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1708, 1730-38 (2002); Fred Anderson et al., Regulatory
Improvement Legislation: Risk Assessment, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Judicial Review, 11 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 89, 90 (2000); John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation:
Case Studies and Implications 24 (ECGI Law Working Paper No. 234/2014).
20 A few scholars have examined judicial review of a collection of BCAs, but even these excep-
tions have been narrowly focused. See, e.g., Edward R. Morrison, Note, Judicial Review of Discount
Rates Used in Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1333, 1351-53 (1998) (discussing
judicial review of agency choice of discount rates in BCA); Coates, supra note 19, at 3 1-85 (evaluating
judicial review of the BCA of recent financial regulations).
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Part I describes the mechanics of BCA and its history in agency deci-
sion making. It also discusses recent congressional movements toward in-
creasing use of BCA in agency decision making.
Against that backdrop, the next three parts correspond to the three dif-
ferent contexts in which courts evaluate permissible BCA. Part II discusses
the first inquiry-the contours of permissible BCA use by agencies, as de-
fined by statutes and as interpreted by agencies and courts. This Part focus-
es on guidance from the Supreme Court.
Part III describes the substantive judicial review of BCA based on our
sample of appellate court decisions implicating an agency's BCA. Although
not an exhaustive census of all appellate cases involving BCA, this substan-
tial sample offers a comprehensive perspective on the state of judicial re-
view. First, this Part describes the standard of judicial review applicable to
the review of agency BCAs. Then, we discuss the way courts have handled
direct challenges to the adequacy of an agency's BCA, including challenges
to the BCA's scope, methodology, and transparency. Overall, there are
many examples of courts promoting high-quality and transparent BCA. The
stringency of judicial review, however, is not consistent.
Furthermore, an agency's BCA can be implicated in litigation even if
it is not directly challenged. Part fV discusses this indirect judicial review
of BCA. Often, these are cases where courts have turned to well-executed
BCAs to support or undermine an agency's reasoning. In these cases, alt-
hough the agency has chosen not to rely on BCA, the reviewing court,
when assessing the reasonableness of the agency's decision, can consider
the BCA as part of the record before the agency at the time the agency
made its decision.
Finally, Part V discusses the implications of the analysis for the future
of regulatory policy. As agencies rely more on BCA in their decision mak-
ing, challenges to BCAs will rise, and judicial review of BCA will become
increasingly important. This Article's review of cases in which BCA played
a central role suggests that the scope of judicial review tends to be limited
to the aforementioned narrowly defined matters related to the agency's stat-
ute. However, within this narrow range it appears that the role of judicial
review to date has been constructive-highlighting when BCA should be
more comprehensive or should play a more instrumental role in agency
decision making. The stakes are high, as BCA is generally only performed
when proposed regulations are thought to have substantial economic im-
pacts. Regulatory reform legislation could, of course, expand this role.
Whether such an expansion would be effective depends in part on the com-
petence of judicial review in dealing with BCA matters-which this Arti-
cle's analysis is intended to illuminate.
Ultimately, we hope that this Article's examination of the state of ju-
dicial review of BCA will trigger informed discussion about the proper role
of courts in reviewing agency BCAs. Armed with this information, scholars
can more effectively evaluate the impact of such judicial checkpoints on the
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use of BCA in agency decision making and assess whether shifting more
regulatory oversight authority to the courts would be an effective approach
to fostering more welfare-enhancing policies.
I. HISTORY OF AGENCY BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS
In federal agencies, BCA has grown from a rudimentary prioritization
method to a sophisticated analysis tool that enables agencies to choose
among various regulatory alternatives in an effort to increase social welfare.
In this Part, we review the history of the use of BCA in the federal agen-
cies.
Most people engage in some form of benefit-cost balancing when
making everyday decisions.2 Among available options, rational persons
identify the option that they expect will maximize their happiness, qualita-
tively considering a host of factors that map to potential costs or benefits of
choosing each option. They then make what they think is the best decision
given the information before them.
This individual decision-making procedure roughly maps to BCA as
implemented by government agencies, although the latter may be more
explicit or rigorous than the former. BCA is a decision-making tool through
which regulators explicitly list, quantify, and, when possible, monetize the
expected benefits and costs of various regulatory alternatives and then pick
the regulatory alternative that maximizes net benefits, subject to statutory
constraints. For example, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
("FMCSA") of the U.S. Department of Transportation ("DOT") may con-
sider a rule that would limit the number of hours that a commercial motor
vehicle driver may drive.22 If the FMCSA decides to reduce the number of
daily driving hours, then relevant industries would have to hire more drivers
to complete deliveries, and these costs would ultimately be passed down to
consumers as increased prices for truck-delivered goods. On the other hand,
a reduction in daily driving hours could reduce the number of crashes at-
tributable to driver fatigue. The agency could convert these changes in
crash risks into monetary measures so that the agency could compare these
21 Judge Williams of the D.C. Circuit has previously cited to Benjamin Franklin's description of
reasoned decision making when describing the basic methodology of BCA. See Int'l Union, United
Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1321 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) ("Thus, cost-benefit analysis entails only a systematic weighing of pros and cons, or what
Benjamin Franklin referred to as a 'moral or prudential algebra."').
22 See FED. MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMIN., DEP'T OF TRANSP., RIN 2126-AB26, 2010-2011
HOURS OF SERVICE RULE REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 1-1 (2011), available at http://www.
regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FMCSA-2004-19608-28406 (analyzing similar regulatory altema-
tives).
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expected benefits to the expected costs. 23 The agency could then decide to
only impose a reduction in daily driving hours if society's value for the
resulting reduction in crashes is greater than the extra cost of consumer
goods. In other words, if the agency is guided by the BCA, it may only
promulgate the rule if society, on net, would benefit from the rule. In this
way, the BCA procedure allows government agencies to prioritize regulato-
ry interventions and take into account the tradeoffs inherent in rulemaking,
focusing efforts on regulations that produce net benefits for society when
the relevant statutory mandates allow the agencies to do so. 24 In the case of
the FMCSA, there is no legal prohibition against basing policies on the
results of the BCA.2 5
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Department of Interi-
or's Bureau of Reclamation have used some form of BCA to assess water-
resource projects since the mid-1940s 6 These agencies were required by
law to justify their policies using a benefit-cost test." The agencies weighed
the costs of the public works projects against principal categories of bene-
fits that included components such as navigation, flood control, irrigation,
electric power, municipal and industrial water supply, and recreation.28
Broadly based requirements of economic assessments of regulations
began with the cost components of a BCA. The origins of regulatory impact
analysis in federal agency decision making can be traced back to the eco-
nomic cost and inflationary impact analysis under President Nixon and
President Ford,29 which were followed by a cost-effectiveness requirement
23 See DEP'T OF TRANSP., REVISED DEPARTMENTAL GUIDANCE 2013: TREATMENT OF THE VALUE
OF PREVENTING FATALITIES AND INJURIES IN PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES 1, 4 (2013), available
at http://www.dot.gov/regulations/economic-values-used-in-analysis (discussing the DOT's values for
reducing fatalities and injuries for use in economic analyses).
24 BCA also guides agencies to consider all relevant factors; can reduce cognitive biases in deci-
sion making; and can promote democratic goals by making decision making more transparent. See
Statement of Christopher DeMuth, in AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1980S, at 504, 505-11
(Martin Feldstein ed., 1994). Of course, there are challenges associated with BCA as some impacts are
difficult to quantify and monetize. In addition, scholars worry that BCA is susceptible to "managing" to
produce favorable outcomes. For more discussion on the criticisms of BCA, see Coates, supra note 19,
at 14.
25 In fact, the FMCSA did base its hours-of-service rules on BCA. The resulting legal challenges
are discussed in Parts III and IV, infra.
26 RICHARD L. BERKMAN & W. KIP VISCUSI, DAMMING THE WEST 6 (1973); OTro ECKSTEIN,
WATER-RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: THE ECONOMICS OF PROJECT EVALUATION 179 (1958). See also
PETER H. SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS SO OFTEN: AND How IT CAN Do BETTER 45-46 (2014)
(dating the birth of BCA to a requirement imposed by Congress in the 1930s).
27 ECKSTEIN, supra note 26, at 2.
28 Id. at 176-78; BERKMAN & VISCUSI, supra note 26, at 7-8.
29 President Nixon created a Quality of Life Review process, managed by OMB, in which any
agency rules pertaining to environmental quality, consumer protection, and occupational and public
health and safety would be submitted to the OMB with a summary of the expected benefits and costs-
but these summaries were basic. President Ford required all agencies to prepare economic impact state-
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under President Carter.3" But it was not until President Reagan issued Exec-
utive Order 12,291 in 1981 that BCA became a mandatory component of
regulatory policy development.3 For the first time, all federal executive
agencies were directed to perform BCA as the analytical core of a regulato-
ry impact analysis, on all major rules, defined as those regulations likely to
have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more.12 The ex-
ecutive order also increased agency accountability to the White House by
formalizing a system of review of agency action headed by the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA") within OMB that continues
in substantial part to the present.33 The shifting of the regulatory oversight
process to OMB at the start of the Reagan administration bolstered the lev-
erage of the oversight group given OMB's pivotal budgetary role.34
Although the requirements in President Reagan's executive order may
have been envisioned to achieve conservative, deregulatory goals, BCA in
practice did not appear to have a substantial deregulatory effect.35 This may
have been partly because the initial rudimentary analyses induced neither
significant delay nor significant reliance. But at least in some instances,
BCA swayed the agency in the opposite direction, encouraging the adoption
of more stringent regulatory standards than would otherwise be consid-
ered.36 And, importantly, Executive Order 12,291 made agencies comforta-
ble with performing BCA-and gave the OMB and the White House in-
formation on the benefits and costs of significant regulatory actions, ena-
bling them to encourage regulatory agencies to promulgate more cost-
beneficial policies.37
ments, discussing the costs of each proposed rule. Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501, 41,501 -
02 (Nov. 29, 1974) (as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,949, 42 Fed. Reg. 1017, 1017 (Jan. 5, 1977)).
President Ford's regulatory review efforts, as well as those of President Carter, were administered by the
Council on Wage and Price Stability, an agency within the Executive Office of the President. The Coun-
cil was abolished at the end of the Carter administration, and the regulatory oversight staff was shifted
back to OMB.
30 President Carter required agencies to consider direct and indirect effects of proposed regula-
tions and to choose the least burdensome of acceptable alternatives when possible in Executive Order
12,044. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661, 12,661 (Mar. 24, 1978).
31 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981).
32 Id. Later executive orders refer to these as "significant" rules.
33 Id. at 13,196-98.
34 Demuth, supra note 24, at 505.
35 See id. at 508-09.
36 One example is the Reagan administration's imposition of a stricter standard for phasing out
lead in gasoline than initially thought warranted, based on the results of the BCA. See id. at 508 ("A
very fine piece of analysis persuaded everyone that the health harms of leaded gasoline were far greater
than we had thought, and we ended up adopting a much tighter program than the one we had inherit-
ed."). For more information about the BCA and the resulting standard, see Albert L. Nichols, Lead in
Gasoline, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT 49, 49-86 (Richard D.
Morgenstern ed., 1997).
37 See Demuth, supra note 24, at 506.
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Hence, when President Clinton took office, he did not dismantle the
growing stronghold of BCA in federal agency decision making. Instead, he
issued a new executive order, Executive Order 12,866, that changed the
atmospherics of the requirements by stressing their welfare-enhancing role
and noting the importance of considerations that could not be monetized.3"
However, Executive Order 12,866 retained OMB's institutional role as well
as the basic features of the prior system. Federal agencies were still re-
quired to "assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives"
and "select those approaches that maximize net benefits."39 This executive
order remains in place, supplemented by President Obama's Executive Or-
der 13,56340 and supported by the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995,
which also requires agencies to evaluate the benefits and costs of covered
rulemakings.'1
Roughly speaking, the agency is responsible for conducting its own
BCA, but there are some internal and external quality checkpoints. Most
agencies have technical guidance documents that describe how the agency
approaches its BCA.42 In addition, OIRA has issued guidance documents
for agency BCA,43 though in practice, agency procedures and relevant esti-
mates widely vary.' Each agency then submits the BCA accompanying its
draft regulations to OIRA, which reviews the agency's compliance with the
executive order and ensures that the proposed regulations are consistent
with the president's overall policy objectives.45 Each year, OIRA completes
hundreds of regulatory reviews," possibly recommending that the agency
38 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
39 Id.
40 Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 (Jan. 21,2011).
41 Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995) (relevant
sections codified in 2 U.S.C. § 1532).
42 See, e.g., OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING & STANDARDS, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OAQPS
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS RESOURCE DOCUMENT 8-11 to 8-13 (1999), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/econdata/6807-305.pdf (BCA resource document for analyses performed
by EPA's OAQPS).
43 See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ExEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4,
REGULATORY ANALYSIS 9-10 (2003); see also Memorandum from Susan E. Dudley, Adm'r, Office of
Info. & Regulatory Affairs, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, & Sharon L. Hayes, Assoc. Dir. & Deputy Dir.
for Sci., Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, to the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies, Updated Principles for
Risk Analysis 10 (Sept. 19,2007).
44 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Individual and Societal Risks to Life and Health, in 1
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 385, 435-44 (Mark J. Machina & W. Kip
Viscusi eds., 2014) (demonstrating how the value of statistical life used to monetize benefits varies
across and within agencies). The cost per life saved also varies widely. See STEPHEN BREYER,
BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATIONS 24-27 (1993).
45 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,738-39 (Oct. 4, 1993).
46 To search for the number of regulatory reviews for a given period of time, see Office of Info. &
Regulatory Affairs, Review Counts, REGINFO, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoCountsSearchlnit?
action-init (last visited Dec. 25, 2014).
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change or withdraw its proposed rule.47 Although there are no requirements
for peer review of agency BCA or other science-based documents, the
OMB also encourages agencies to seek out peer review in order to increase
the quality and credibility of the analyses supporting their decision mak-ing. 48
Despite the internal guidance and OIRA review, agency compliance
with the spirit and letter of the executive order is not high. An analysis of
seventy-four agency BCAs that span the Reagan, first Bush, and Clinton
administrations revealed that many did not provide information on net ben-
efits and policy alternatives. 49 While all BCAs provided at least some in-
formation on costs, a much smaller proportion of BCAs in each administra-
tion quantified, much less monetized, benefits." Although these statistics do
not directly shed light on the quality of the BCAs, they imply that, in prac-
tice, at least some BCAs are not as useful for determining whether regula-
tion would produce net benefits or whether the chosen policy is welfare-
maximizing given available alternatives. And even those BCAs that provide
estimates of benefits and costs may have deeper quality issues-they may
be missing important categories of costs or benefits, or the underlying as-
sumptions may be faulty. The usefulness of BCA in agency decision mak-
ing hinges on the quality of the BCA; a poor-quality BCA is unlikely to
foster rational policy decisions.
Due to the increasing agency reliance on BCA and the importance of
ensuring high-quality BCA, it is not surprising that challenges to the under-
lying analyses often appear in litigation. On review, a BCA becomes rele-
vant in three basic ways. First, the courts could be asked to determine
whether an agency permissibly relied on a BCA as a basis for its rulemak-
ing. Second, the courts could be asked to review the adequacy of the
BCA-acting as an additional quality checkpoint on the analysis. And fi-
nally, the courts could use the BCA, present in the agency record, as evi-
dence either for or against the adopted final rule, depending on the persua-
siveness of the analysis. The next Part discusses the first of these judicial
inquiries, outlining the contours of BCA permissibility given the relevant
statutory language. The remaining two inquiries are discussed in detail in
Parts III and IV.
47 For a more detailed overview of the OIRA review process, see U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-03-929, OMB'S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF AGENCIES' DRAFT RULES AND THE
TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS 29-38 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03929.
pdf.
48 See Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664, 2665-66 (Jan. 14,
2005).
49 Robert W. Hahn & Patrick M. Dudley, How Well Does the US. Government Do Benefit-Cost
Analysis?, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 192, 192-211 (2007).
50 Id. at 199, 203.
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II. PERMISSIBILITY OF AGENCY BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS
As discussed previously, BCA can be a useful tool in agency decision
making. Despite the executive order requirements, an agency can only rely
on a BCA as the basis for its regulation if allowed to do so by the relevant
statutory provision it is enforcing. Sometimes the enabling legislation re-
quires BCA; one such example is the instruction to mitigate unreasonable
environmental effects under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodent-
icide Act." In other instances, statutory provisions, such as provisions gov-
erning the establishment of national ambient air-quality standards under the
Clean Air Act ("CAA"), prohibit an agency's reliance on BCA in selecting
regulatory policies. 2 In these instances, a regulatory reform law enacting a
substantive supermandate to override these provisions to either permit or
require BCA would be needed for the agency to be able to base its policies
on a BCA test.
But, many statutes are not explicit about whether they require, permit,
or prohibit BCA.53 An inquiry into the contours of BCA permissibility re-
quires an examination of U.S. Supreme Court decisions on this issue. In
1981, the Court first shed light on the permissibility of benefit-cost balanc-
ing in American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan.4 Repre-
senting the interests of the cotton industry, the petitioners argued that the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 required the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") to engage in benefit-cost
analysis when promulgating standards under § 6(b)(5). 5 In fact, the statute
directed OSHA to set a standard that would adequately protect employees
"to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence."56 The
Court held that this language did not require BCA, but instead required
feasibility analysis, wherein OSHA must set the standard at the most pro-
tective level that it determines to be technologically and economically "ca-
pable of being done. 57
Despite the Court's refusal to find a requirement for BCA implicit in
that statutory language, the Court's decision did not necessarily dissuade
51 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (2012) (definition of unreasonable adverse effect on the environment).
Other examples include the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1) (2012); the Energy
Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6295(o)(2)(B)(i) (2012); and the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(3)(C)(i) (2012).
52 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2012). Other examples include the decision to list a species under the
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2012).
53 For an overview of statutory variants on the consideration of costs, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 8,
at 12-16.
14 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
'5 Id. at 506.
56 Id. at 508 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57 Id. at 509 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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agencies from choosing to employ BCA when administering statutes with
ambiguous language. In particular, the Supreme Court decided Chevron v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ("Chevron")" only a few years
later, establishing a more deferential two-step procedure for judicially re-
viewing the permissibility of agency action going forward. 9 First, Chevron
directed courts to determine whether the relevant statutory language was
clear and on point using traditional tools of statutory interpretation.60 If the
statutory language were clear, the agency would have to follow Congress's
unambiguously expressed instruction.6 If Congress's intentions were un-
clear and the language were open to multiple interpretations, then in step
two the court would defer to the agency's interpretation as long as the in-
terpretation was permissible and not foreclosed by the statutory language.62
The Chevron method was to give more leeway to the agency, acknowledg-
ing its interpretative mandate from Congress to implement the statute and
its relative expertise in regulatory affairs as compared to the courts.63
In 2001, however, the Supreme Court implied in Whitman v. American
Trucking Ass 'ns ("American Trucking")' that it would not find authoriza-
tion for BCA implicit in ambiguous statutory language.65 Under § 109(b) of
the CAA, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") was directed
to set national ambient air-quality standards that were "requisite to protect
the public health" with "an adequate margin of safety."66 Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia found it "fairly clear that this text does not permit
the EPA to consider costs in setting the standards"--but supported this
view by applying statutory canons of construction and using contextual
clues from the rest of the CAA.67 In particular, Justice Scalia found it telling
that certain other provisions of the statute explicitly allowed the considera-
tion of costs, suggesting that congressional silence in the challenged provi-
sion with respect to the consideration of costs was intentional in this case.68
A few years later, the Supreme Court was again asked to evaluate
whether the EPA could use BCA in its decision making, but this time the
challenged provision was in the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). In Entergy
Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.,69 the Court held that the section instructing the
58 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
'9 Id. at 842-43.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 843.
63 Id. at 865.
64 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
65 Id. at 467 ("We have therefore refused to find implicit in ambiguous sections of the CAA an
authorization to consider costs that has elsewhere, and so often, been expressly granted.").
66 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012).
67 Whitman, 531 U.S. at 465-66.
68 Id. at 467.
69 556 U.S. 208 (2009).
2015]
GEO. MASON L. REV.
EPA to set standards for cooling water intake structures that reflected "the
best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact"7
did allow BCA.7" Justice Scalia, again writing for the majority, acknowl-
edged that the statutory text was ambiguous and accepted the EPA's deci-
sion to employ BCA as a reasonable interpretation of the statute.7 2 This
time, when viewed in the context of the rest of the CWA, the congressional
silence with respect to the consideration of costs did not unequivocally im-
ply an intention to limit agency discretion.73
Finally, in EPA v. EMiE Homer City Generation ("Homer City Gen-
eration"),74 the Court confirmed that statutory silence regarding the consid-
eration of costs did not always imply an intention to bar such considera-
tion-even in other provisions of the CAA.75 In a decision written by Jus-
tice Ginsburg, the Court permitted the EPA to consider costs when promul-
gating regulations under the ambiguous Good Neighbor Provision of the
CAA.76 The EPA implemented the provision as follows: if the agency finds
that one state's upwind emissions significantly contribute to another state's
nonattainment, then it requires cost-effective reductions in emissions in the
contributing state.77 In this way, the level of emission abatement required
depended on the costs associated with the reductions-and was not neces-
sarily limited by the state's overall contribution.78 Essentially, the EPA used
cost-effectiveness analysis, a less-stringent cousin of BCA that considers
the least costly means to achieve a given benefit, to determine how to allo-
cate emissions reductions among states that contribute to their neighbors'
air pollution problems.79
But the Court did not just concede that an evaluation of costs and ben-
efits was permissible under this ambiguous provision of the CAA; the Court
actively supported the EPA's decision to consider costs in this context, stat-
ing that it simply "makes good sense."8 Adopting the language of an econ-
omist, the Court characterized the EPA's task as an "allocation problem"-
and commended the agency for choosing an "efficient and equitable solu-
tion."8' Although the Court's reasoning may be consistent with, or at least
not in conflict with, its previous decisions, it is difficult not to get the
70 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2012).
71 Entergy Corp., 556 U.S. at 226.
72 Id. at 219-20, 226.
73 Id. at 222-23.
74 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014).
75 Id. at 1604.
76 Id. at 1609.
77 Id. at 1597.
78 Id. at 1597-98.
79 Id. at 1596.
80 Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. at 1607.
81 Id.
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impression that the Court has become more receptive to the use of BCA in
the thirteen years since American Trucking was decided.82
Of course, the statutory text is still the source of BCA authority. But
Congress has not revisited many fundamental statutes, especially in the
environmental arena, in more than thirty years.83 As benefit-cost estimation
techniques improve and as the analysis becomes less controversial, BCA is
becoming the choice tool for reasoned decision making in many federal
agencies.84 Despite the static statutory language, it is possible that courts
will be more likely to find that BCA is at least permissible whenever the
agency has discretion to determine reasonable action. Although Executive
Order 13,563 and its predecessors do not create any judicially enforceable
rights,85 their instruction that agencies adopt only regulations that pass a
BCA to the extent permitted by law 6 may have contributed to a changing
tide in favor of outright judicial encouragement of BCA when permissible.
The signposts of this changing tide may be embedded in the Supreme
Court's Homer City Generation decision and in the recent decisions pro-
moting rigorous BCA of financial regulations handed down by the D.C.
Circuit.87
There have also been movements in the federal legislature for a statu-
tory mandate for BCA-based decision making when permissible, but no
proposed bill has received sufficient traction to date. For example, in the
113th Congress, Senator Rob Portman introduced the Regulatory Account-
ability Act of 2013, which would require agencies to conduct BCA for all
major and high-impact rules and to rely on the BCA in decision making
whenever permissible by law.88 The bill was referred to a subcommittee for
consideration.89
82 In June 2015, the Supreme Court will decide another relevant issue: whether the EPA should
have considered costs when it determined that regulation of electric utility steam generating units was
"appropriate and necessary" under the CAA. See White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d
1222 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted in part sub nom. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 702 (2014) (No. 14-46)
(and consolidated cases). A decision against the EPA, denying the agency deference to its interpretation
of the statutory direction and finding that the agency should have considered costs, would show strong
support for requiring some BCA in agency decision making whenever arguably permissible, but the
Court is not expected to take such a bold step.
83 See Jonathan M. Gilligan & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Accounting for Political Feasibility in
Climate Instrument Choice, 32 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 5-6 (2014).
84 SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 6-7.
85 See, e.g., Nat'l Truck Equip. Ass'n v. NHTSA, 711 F.3d 662, 670 (6th Cir. 2013).
86 Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011) ("As stated in [Executive
Order 12,866] and to the extent permitted by law, each agency must.., propose or adopt a regulation
only upon a reasoned determination that its benefits justify its costs .... ").
87 See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1149-51 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
88 S. 1029, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013).
89 S.1029 - Regulatory Accountability Act of 2013, CONGRESS, https://www.congress.gov/bill/I 13
th-congress/senate-bill/1029/all-actions (last visited Dec. 25, 2014).
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One might also envision legislation imposing a supermandate that
would override current statutory restrictions on BCA-based decision mak-
ing.9" Although such a bill has not been proposed in the most recent Con-
gress, the Senate and the House of Representatives are considering in com-
mittee the Sound Regulation Act of 2014, which, in addition to encouraging
cost-justified rules by requiring agencies to conduct BCA, would require
each agency to report to Congress specific recommendations for how to
lower regulatory costs by amending the statutes prohibiting BCA in rule-
making.9' The bill, if enacted, would be a stepping-stone to eliminating
statutory prohibitions on BCA.
The ramifications of such legislation for regulatory oversight in gen-
eral could be substantial, as most regulatory costs are undertaken under
statutes that prohibit basing policies on BCA.92 There may even be noticea-
ble effects on promulgated regulations in the case of procedural require-
ments because, unlike the executive order requirements, the legislative re-
quirements may be subject to judicial review.93 Hence, the scope of judicial
review allowed by the legislation is an important issue for legislators to
consider when deciding whether to enact such BCA mandates.94 The next
Part briefly describes the standard courts currently use to evaluate agency
BCA and then highlights the nature of judicial review in practice by dis-
cussing a broad sample of relevant cases. Insights from our analysis could
inform how future policymakers may want to structure their regulatory re-
form bills.
90 See Cass R. Sunstein, Legislative Foreword: Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-
Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REv. 247, 270-71 (1996) (discussing different types of supermandates).
91 S. 2099, 113th Cong. § 3 (2014); H.R. 3863, 113th Cong. § 3 (2014) ("Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, including any provision of law that explicitly prohibits the use of cost-benefit
analysis in rulemaking, an agency shall conduct cost-benefit analyses and report to Congress the find-
ings with specific recommendations for how to lower regulatory costs by amending the statutes prohibit-
ing the use thereof.").
92 See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41974, COST-BENEFIT AND OTHER
ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 35 (2011).
93 Judicial review of environmental impact statements ("EIS")'s under the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act ('NEPA") could provide a glimpse into judicial review of procedural BCA requirements
such as those considered by Congress. Pursuant to the NEPA, an agency prepares an EIS that weighs the
economic and environmental costs and benefits of the proposed regulatory policy as compared to alter-
native policies. A brief examination of judicial review of the adequacy of an agency's EIS reveals that
the review is similar to what courts do when evaluating the reasonableness of an agency's relied-upon
BCA. See Webster v. USDA, 685 F.3d 411, 430 (4th Cir. 2012) (explaining that a court will find an EIS
deficient "if its assessment of the costs and benefits of a proposed action relies upon 'misleading eco-
nomic assumptions' that "can prevent the agency from engaging in informed decisionmaking when
balancing the proposed action's benefits with its environmental effects" and "can also preclude mean-
ingful public participation 'by skewing the public's evaluation of the action." (citation omitted) (quot-
ing Hughes River Watershed Conservancy v. Glickman, 81 F.3d 437, 446 (4th Cir. 1996))).
94 See Anderson et al., supra note 19, at 109.
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III. ADEQUACY OF AGENCY BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS
The increase of agency BCA-whether encouraged by courts, required
by Congress, promoted by the executive branch, or performed by agencies
interested in adopting sound policies-makes it more likely that federal
courts will see BCA in the agency record in litigation. In addition to inter-
preting whether the relevant statutory provision permits BCA, courts are
being asked to examine the underlying reasoning and assumptions in the
BCA.
This Part provides an example-focused look at judicial review of
agency BCA in practice. This Article evaluated a sample of thirty-eight
cases in which the court reviewed an agency's BCA. Cases were included
in our database if they were identified in a series of specific searches on
Westlaw.95 We removed duplicates, pre-State Farm cases,96 pre-Chevron
cases, 97 cases subsequently overturned in relevant part, and district court
decisions.98 While this sample is certainly not a complete list of relevant
cases, we believe that it is a broadly representative sample for analyzing
how courts review BCA in practice. Every year, executive agencies prom-
ulgate approximately thirty non-transfer rules that are accompanied by
some form of BCA.99 Of the rules that are challenged, only some are chal-
lenged on the basis of their BCA. And then, a smaller percentage of these
judicial reviews are appealed.' ° We did not expect to find many more cases
that demonstrate judicial review of agency BCA during the time period for
our case search.
Table 1 lists the cases included in our sample. More than half of the
cases come from either the EPA or an office within the DOT. In almost 60
percent of the cases, the court upheld the agency's BCA in total-
approving its scope, its assumptions, or its transparency. In about 40 per-
cent of the cases, however, the court criticized at least some part of the
BCA, sometimes aggressively, pointing out perceived flaws in the analysis.
The next Section briefly reviews the standard courts use to evaluate BCA
under these circumstances before discussing judicial review in practice.
95 We used variations of searches such as "("regulatory impact analysis") & (("consider!" /s
"benefit!") ("consider!" /s "cost!") ("consider!" /s "alter!"))" to focus in on cases in which the court
commented on agency BCA. We also followed up on citations within relevant cases.
96 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983).
97 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
98 In addition, we removed cases that focused solely on the threshold question of whether BCA is
allowed by the statute. See supra Part II.
99 See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2014 DRAFT
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED
MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 2 (2014). This total does not include rules prom-
ulgated by independent agencies, which contribute another ten to twenty rules each year.
100 See infra Table 1.
2015]
GEO. MASON L. REV.
A. Standard of Review
If an agency is allowed to weigh benefits and costs when deciding how
to implement a statutory provision and the agency subsequently relies on a
BCA, then a court may be asked to evaluate the BCA when it reviews the
reasonableness of the agency action. Statutory requirements that the agency
weigh benefits and costs could enhance this role. The level of scrutiny that
a reviewing court generally applies to evaluate agency decision making is
the arbitrary or capricious standard prescribed by the APA (the so-called
"hard look" review).,l ' Roughly speaking, the court must ensure that agency
action is rationally related to the relevant evidence before the agency.
The APA's arbitrary or capricious test is generally considered to be
deferential-and it may be especially so when a court evaluates the adequa-
cy of an agency's BCA. The Supreme Court has consistently reminded
courts that the scope of review is "narrow" and "a court is not to substitute
its judgment for that of the agency."'0 2 In addition, when an agency makes
"predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science,"
the reviewing court should "generally be at its most deferential."'0 3 In prac-
tice, a BCA is the kind of analysis that often requires an agency to make
many predictions based on available scientific and technical evidence-
such as, for example, predictions about the emission-reduction benefits
associated with a particular air-pollution-control technology or predictions
about the cost of implementing a particular workplace-safety regulation."°
In this way, Supreme Court precedent can be read to require courts to be
particularly hands off when it comes to evaluating the substance of agency
10' 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (stating the judicial obligation to set aside an agency action that is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law"). Some statutes
require all agency decisions to be based on substantial evidence, but most courts believe that the review
under these two standards is the same. See, e.g., Butte Cnty. v. Hogen, 613 F.3d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir.
2010); Ace Tel. Ass'n v. Koppendrayer, 432 F.3d 876, 880 (8th Cir. 2005). In fact, in 1984, as a D.C.
Circuit Judge, Justice Scalia claimed an emerging consensus within the courts of appeals that there was
no real distinction between the two tests. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors of
Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1984). That said, some courts, such as the Eleventh
Circuit, still hold the view that the substantial evidence test calls for stricter scrutiny. See Vertex Dev.,
LLC v. Manatee Cnty., 761 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1359 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (citing Color Pigments Mfrs.
Ass'n v. OSHA, 16 F.3d 1157, 1160 (1 lth Cir. 1994)). To the extent that a court evaluated an agency
BCA using what it considered to be a stricter review than under the arbitrary or capricious test, we make
a note for the reader. These cases are also flagged in Table 1 with a "" in the column that indicates
judicial disapproval of BCA. See infra Table 1.
102 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983).
103 BaIt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983).
104 See, e.g., Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("The agency was
to identify the costs and benefits of alternative standards, measure them, and select the standard which
displays the greatest net benefit. This is more easily said than done, since ... the process was as much
one of prediction as of analysis.").
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BCA. Other courts have explicitly reasoned that agency determinations
based on the weighing of expected benefits and costs are best left to agency
expertise.' °
That said, the arbitrary or capricious test is not without some bite, even
in the context of evaluating an agency's BCA. For example, in Motor Vehi-
cle Manufacturers Ass 'n of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Co. ("State Farm"),"6 the Supreme Court stated that
an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the prod-
uct of agency expertise.1
0 7
In this way, the Court succinctly predicted-or influenced the development
of-the current style of BCA policing by reviewing courts. Hence, courts
primarily examine whether all statutory factors and other important aspects
of the issue were considered in the BCA and whether the BCA is well
founded in available scientific evidence. 0 8
Generally speaking, if an agency relies on a BCA, the court will eval-
uate whether the BCA is reasonable.'09 But the reviewing court will general-
ly not reverse "simply because there are uncertainties, analytic imperfec-
tions, or even mistakes in the pieces of the picture petitioners have chosen
to bring to [the court's] attention," but rather "when there is such an ab-
sence of overall rational support as to warrant the description 'arbitrary or
capricious."'. 0 Upon finding a defect in the analysis, courts look to the se-
riousness of the flaw and the likelihood that correcting the error will change
the agency's ultimate decision."' Courts also consider the persuasiveness of
105 See, e.g., id at 1342 ("This is especially true when the agency is called upon to weigh the costs
and benefits of alternative policies, since '[s]uch cost-benefit analyses epitomize the types of decisions
that are most appropriately entrusted to the expertise of an agency .... ' (alteration in original) (quoting
Office of Commc'n of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1440 (D.C. Cir. 1983))); Nat'l
Ass'n of Home Builders v. EPA., 682 F.3d 1032, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ("[W]e review such a cost-
benefit analysis deferentially."); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (per
curiam) ("[In view of the complex nature of economic analysis typical in the regulation promulgation
process, [the petitioners'] burden to show error is high.").
106 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
107 Id. at43.
108 Some of the examined BCAs were performed in the context of environmental impact statements
required under NEPA. See discussion supra note 93.
109 See City of Portland v. EPA, 507 F.3d 706, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that the court "will
[not] tolerate rules based on arbitrary and capricious cost-benefit analyses").
110 Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
111 See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. EPA, 682 F.3d 1032, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
("[W]hen an agency decides to rely on a cost-benefit analysis as part of its rulemaking, a serious flaw
undermining that analysis can render the rule unreasonable."); City of Portland, 507 F.3d at 713 ("In the
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the BCA as part of the evidence before the agency to determine whether the
agency's chosen regulatory action was reasonable in light of this evi-
dence."2 The next Section provides an overview of judicial review of BCA
based on an analysis of relevant cases on appeal.
B. Empirical Examination of Judicial Review
When an agency is allowed to rely on a BCA to implement a statutory
provision and subsequently does rely on such a BCA, the BCA must be
reasonable. Because of this, a reviewing court is sometimes asked to con-
sider the adequacy of an agency's BCA in terms of its scope and quality. As
previously discussed, a court reviews an agency's economic analysis defer-
entially, in recognition of the agency's technical expertise and Congress's
intention to entrust the task of balancing the benefits and costs of policy
alternatives to the agency. Despite this generally deferential view, courts
have taken issue with certain BCAs. There are essentially three types of
flaws that can topple an agency's BCA under certain circumstances. The
first is when the scope is inadequate, often because the BCA ignores an
important-or statutorily mandated-aspect of the problem. The second is
when the BCA's methodology or assumptions go against scientific evi-
dence or reason. And the third is when an agency fails to disclose the
BCA's assumptions or methodology to interested parties. This Section dis-
cusses each of these flaws in turn and provides examples of relevant judi-
cial review.
1. Scope
A BCA is most useful when it quantifies and monetizes all relevant
benefits and costs of all reasonable alternatives. The agency often retains
some discretion when deciding which benefits and costs are relevant and
which alternatives to consider, as well as when deciding how rigorously to
analyze each factor." 3 These scope and depth decisions are unavoidable in
the context of conducting a BCA, and a court generally reviews these
narrow context of this case ... remanding this rule to the Agency based on flaws in its cost-benefit
analysis would be pointless. Even were EPA to redress its alleged errors, the final rule would remain
unchanged, making this the epitome of harmless error.").
1t2 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1217-18 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in
part by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
113 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Herrington, 768 F.2d 1355, 1417 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
("In light of the broad deference appropriately due an agency in allocating its limited resources for
investigation of different aspects of a complex and highly technical regulatory problem, we refrain from
holding that DOE was legally required to conduct a more thorough factual inquiry into [this aspect of
the problem].").
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judgments deferentially as long as the agency's decisions are reasonable." 4
Table 2 describes the scope challenges in our dataset of cases.
In some instances, however, the relevant statutory provision provides
guidance on the scope (and potentially the depth) of permissible analysis." 5
The statutory language can support an agency's decision to limit the scope
of its BCA. For example, in City of Waukesha v. EPA,"6 the EPA was re-
quired to prepare a BCA when setting a maximum contaminant level
("MCL") for uranium under the Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA")." 7
Instead of evaluating the total benefits and costs accruing to the uranium
MCL-which would include the benefits and costs arising from compliance
with the MCLs at hazardous waste sites governed by the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act-the EPA only
evaluated the benefits and costs arising from compliance under the
SDWA.' 8 Given the language of the SDWA's provision, the court found
the EPA's decision to limit the scope of the BCA to be reasonable." 9 In
addition, the statutory language can support an agency's decision to employ
a less rigorous form of BCA. 12°
But, statutory language can also expand the scope of an agency's
BCA. Specifically, the relevant provision may include a list of factors that
the agency must consider in making its decision. In State Farm, the Su-
preme Court stated that an agency cannot "entirely fail[] to consider an im-
portant aspect of the problem."' 2' A statutorily mandated factor is, "by defi-
nition... an important aspect of any issue before an administrative agency,
as it is for Congress in the first instance to define the appropriate scope of
an agency's mission."'22 Thus, if the agency relies on a BCA that fails to
consider such a statutorily mandated factor, the court will invalidate the
agency's action. Such was the case when the FMCSA failed to analyze in
its BCA whether the electronic monitoring devices it mandated in its rule
114 Id. at 1416-17.
115 In Entergy Corp., the Supreme Court suggested that even the rigor of permissible BCA may
depend on the specific statutory language allowing BCA. See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556
U.S. 208, 223 (2009) ("[l]t was well within the bounds of reasonable interpretation for the EPA to
conclude that cost-benefit analysis is not categorically forbidden. Other arguments may be available to
preclude such a rigorous form of cost-benefit analysis as that which was prescribed under the statute's
former... standard.").
116 320 F.3d 228 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
117 Id. at 242-43.
118 id.
119 Id. at 243-44.
120 Am. Mining Cong. v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 617, 632 (10th Cir. 1985) ("This language, in the
context of the entire legislative history of [the relevant provision] ... convinces us that Congress intend-
ed cost-benefit analysis, but less strict than an optimized cost-benefit analysis.").
121 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983).
122 Pub. Citizen v. FMCSA, 374 F.3d 1209, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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would harass vehicle operators.'23 In another example, the FMCSA failed to
consider the impact of changing the maximum allowable driving hours on
the health of drivers, also a statutorily mandated factor. 1
24
Relying on the statutory language to determine the scope of an agen-
cy's BCA can lead to inconsistent results, however, if different courts do
not agree on the interpretation of Congress's intent. Such was the case
when courts analyzed the permissible scope of BCA under a provision of
the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") that requires the U.S. Fish and Wild-
life Service ("FWS") to perform an economic analysis of any critical habi-
tat designation. 25 The FWS interpreted the scope of this BCA to include the
but-for benefits and costs associated with designating critical habitats-
taking as given the benefits and costs of listing the species (a decision that
must be made without considering costs) and other decisions under the
ESA. 6 The Tenth Circuit took issue with this "incremental baseline ap-
proach," holding that it would render the economic analysis "virtually
meaningless," especially in light of the other decisions required under the
ESA that occur prior to or contemporaneously with the critical habitat des-
ignation.'27 Hence, the court concluded that the FWS's interpretation of the
scope of BCA required for the critical habitat designation was prohibited by
the language and intent of the ESA.' But, when the Ninth Circuit was
faced with deciding this same question almost a decade later, it refused to
follow the Tenth Circuit.' 29 Although the understanding of other decisions
under the ESA had changed since the Tenth Circuit's decision, rendering
some of the Tenth Circuit's reasoning flawed, the Ninth Circuit made a
point to comment that the "baseline approach is, if anything, more logical"
given the purpose of a BCA in this context. 3°
Oftentimes, however, a statute encourages the consideration of bene-
fits and costs, but provides little additional guidance as to the scope of al-
123 Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n v. FMCSA, 656 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 2011) ("We
conclude that the rule cannot stand because the Agency failed to consider an issue that it was statutorily
required to address. Specifically, the Agency said nothing about the requirement that any regulation
about the use of monitoring devices in commercial vehicles must 'ensure that the devices are not used to
harass vehicle operators."' (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 31137(a))).
124 Pub. Citizen, 374 F.3d at 1216 ("We hold that the final rule is arbitrary and capricious because
the agency neglected to consider a statutorily mandated factor-the impact of the rule on the health of
drivers.").
125 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2012).
126 N.M. Cattle Growers Ass'n v. FWS, 248 F.3d 1277, 1283 (10th Cir. 2001).
127 Id. at 1280, 1285.
128 Id. at 1285 ("[W]e conclude Congress intended that the FWS conduct a full analysis of all of
the economic impacts of a critical habitat designation, regardless of whether those impacts are attributa-
ble co-extensively to other causes. Thus, we hold the baseline approach to economic analysis is not in
accord with the language or intent of the ESA.").
129 Ariz. Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160, 1173 (9th Cir. 2010).
130 Id.
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lowable BCA. T'' In these cases, the court gives the agency "considerable
latitude in deciding how far to inquire into further benefits and burdens 'the
[agency] considers relevant.' 11 32 While courts may require that the treat-
ment of costs be commensurate with the treatment of benefits,' this in-
quiry is generally deferential.'34
Nonetheless, there are examples in which courts have invalidated an
agency's action based on reliance on an "incomplete" BCA. '35 The support
for this judicial role again comes from State Farm-as a reviewing court
must ensure that an agency does not miss an important aspect of the prob-
lem.'36 In the context of a BCA, this could refer to the agency's omission of
an important factor in its entirety or to the agency's failure to adequately
quantify or monetize the factor in its analysis.
Acting in this role, courts have identified instances where the agency
has failed to fully consider important categories of a rule's costs in its BCA.
A key example is the Fifth Circuit's "especially aggressive"'37 review of
131 Or, the statute may require that the agency quantify relevant factors to the greatest extent prac-
ticable. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Herrington, 768 F.2d 1355, 1400 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
("Congress thus mandated quantitative analysis of the factors relevant to economic justification 'to the
greatest extent practicable.' Congress did not, however, inflexibly require that DOE's forecasts be based
on precisely and minutely verifiable details.").
132 Id. at 1417 (quoting another source).
133 Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 979 (5th Cir. 1983) ("The [agency] cannot tip the scales of
an EIS by promoting possible benefits while ignoring their costs. Simple logic, fairness, and the premis-
es of cost-benefit analysis, let alone [the National Environmental Policy Act], demand that a cost-benefit
analysis be carried out objectively. There can be no 'hard look' at costs and benefits unless all costs are
disclosed.").
134 See Natural Res. Def. Council, 768 F.2d at 1416-17.
135 We stress that this trend might not be limited to cases where the agency was required to rely on
some sort of BCA. The D.C. Circuit has stated that an agency cannot save its reliance on an incomplete
or flimsy BCA by arguing that it was not required to rely on BCA. See, e.g., Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins.
Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 177 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("The SEC conducted a [BCA] when it issued the rule
with no assertion that it was not required to do so. Therefore, the SEC must defend its analysis before
the court upon the basis it employed in adopting that analysis.").
136 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983).
137 SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 48. We note that the Fifth Circuit in Corrosion Proof applied a
stricter review under the "substantial evidence" standard than it thought would be required by the "arbi-
trary or capricious" standard. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1213-14 (5th Cir.
1991) ("[T]he arbitrary and capricious standard found in the APA and the substantial evidence standard
found in TSCA are different standards . . . . 'The substantial evidence standard mandated by [TSCA] is
generally considered to be more rigorous than the arbitrary and capricious standard normally applied to
informal rulemaking,' and 'afford[s] a considerably more generous judicial review' than the arbitrary
and capricious test." (second and third alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Envtl. Def
Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 636 F.2d 1267, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136, 143 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977))).
During the conference, Professor Michael Greve suggested that this might be why the challengers de-
cided to litigate the case in the Fifth Circuit as opposed to in the D.C. Circuit, which believed that the
two standards of review were the same. Michael Greve, Professor, George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law,
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EPA's ban on asbestos manufacture, importation, processing, and distribu-
tion promulgated under the Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA"). 35 In
addition to identifying a number of methodological flaws in the EPA's
BCA, 39 the court criticized the agency for failing to consider the unintend-
ed consequences of a ban on asbestos, such as the increased use of danger-
ous substitutes.4 ° For the court, this omission rendered the comparison of
benefits and costs of the ban incomplete and the reliance on this BCA un-
reasonable. 4' Similarly, the D.C. Circuit invalidated several rules of the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") due to the agency's failure
to fully consider the benefits and costs of the rules, given its statutory re-
quirement to consider effects on efficiency, competition, and capital for-
mation.'42 For example, in Business Roundtable v. SEC,' the court criti-
cized the agency for "inconsistently and opportunistically fram[ing] the
costs and benefits" and failing to quantify certain costs.'" In addition, the
D.C. Circuit has criticized the Department of Energy ("DOE") for failing to
make a "serious effort" to quantify costs when its statutory obligation under
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act "mandated quantitative analysis of
the factors relevant to economic justification 'to the greatest extent practi-
cable. """
But, courts are not only concerned with failures to consider or quantify
important categories of costs; courts also look for omissions of important
categories of benefits when reviewing the adequacy of an agency's BCA.
For example, when the Ninth Circuit reviewed the National Highway Traf-
fic Safety Administration ("NHTSA")'s rule setting corporate average fuel
economy standards for light trucks, it found, among other things, that the
NHTSA's failure to monetize the benefits of greenhouse gas emissions re-
ductions in its BCA was arbitrary and capricious.'46 Even accepting the
NHTSA's contention that there is disagreement on the value of the reduc-
tions within the scientific community, the court found that their value was
"certainly not zero."'47 In this case, the court displayed an understanding
that, in the context of a BCA, categories not quantified or monetized might
Law and Economics Center: Public Policy Conference on Administration Unbound? Delegation, Defer-
ence, and Discretion (Sept. 12, 2014).
138 Corrosion Proof, 947 F.2d at 1217-19.
139 See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
140 Corrosion Proof 947 F.2d at 1221-22, 1224, 1226.
141 Id. at 1224-25, 1229.
142 See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1448-49 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Chamber of
Commerce of the U.S. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
143 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
144 Id. at 1148-49.
145 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Herrington, 768 F.2d 1355, 1400 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
146 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1200 (9th Cir. 2008).
147 id.
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end up being forgotten. 4 ' The D.C. Circuit has also commented that the
lack of precise data on an effect is not an excuse for ignoring that effect,
especially when the effect's inclusion could change the balance of the
BCA.'49 Perhaps in the absence of a statutory limitation on the scope of
BCA, courts will increasingly encourage the agency to conduct as complete
and rigorous a BCA as is feasible. 5 '
Without a statutory cue, the categories of costs or benefits that the
court determines are feasible or reasonable for the agency to analyze, how-
ever, may change over time depending on the context. For example, in
1990, the D.C. Circuit allowed the NHTSA to ignore the negative safety
effects of higher corporate average fuel economy standards in its BCA. 5'
The agency conceded, however, that higher corporate fuel economy stand-
ards may lead to vehicle size reductions that may reduce passenger safety,
and that this size-safety relationship may become important if corporate
average fuel economy standards are raised any higher.' But the court de-
ferred to the NHTSA's contention that "the time for such an assessment has
not yet come."'53 By 1992, the time had come, and the D.C. Circuit found
that the agency now owed the public a reasoned analysis of this size-safety
tradeoff, given the agency's decision not to reduce the latest corporate aver-
age fuel economy standard.'54
Finally, an important aspect of the problem missing from the analysis
might not be a category of benefits or costs at all-but rather the benefits
148 This is a common criticism on the reliance on BCA-that it minimizes the role of important
factors that cannot be adequately quantified or monetized at present. See, e.g., Coates, supra note 19, at
88. In other cases, however, the court may be concerned that unquantified effects could be used as a
"trump card" when justifying the rule. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1219 (5th
Cir. 1991) ("While TSCA contemplates a useful place for unquantified benefits beyond the EPA's
calculation, unquantified benefits never were intended as a trump card allowing the EPA to justify any
cost calculus, no matter how high.").
149 Pub. Citizen v. FMCSA, 374 F.3d 1209, 1218-19 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("[T]he model disregarded
the effects of 'time on task' because, the agency said, it did not have sufficient data on the magnitude of
such effects .... The mere fact that the magnitude of time-on-task effects is uncertain is no justification
for disregarding the effect entirely .... In light of this dubious assumption, the agency's cost-benefit
analysis is questionable .... (quoting Hours of Service of Drivers; Driver Rest and Sleep for Safe
Operations, 68 Fed. Reg. 22,456, 22,497 (Apr. 28, 2003)).
150 Compare Corrosion Proof, 947 F.2d at 1222 ("While Congress did not dictate that the EPA
engage in an exhaustive, full-scale cost-benefit analysis, it did require the EPA to consider both sides of
the regulatory equation, and it rejected the notion that the EPA should pursue the reduction of workplace
risk at any cost."), with Natural Res. Def Council., 768 F.2d at 1417 ("In light of the broad deference
appropriately due an agency in allocating its limited resources for investigation of different aspects of a
complex and highly technical regulatory problem, we refrain from holding that DOE was legally re-
quired to conduct a more thorough factual inquiry into [this aspect of the problem].").
151 See Competitive Enter. Inst. v. NHTSA, 901 F.2d 107, 120-22 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
152 Id. at 121-22.
153 ld.
154 Competitive Enter. Inst. v. NHTSA, 956 F.2d 321, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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and costs of a separate alternative not considered by the agency. In Corro-
sion Proof Fittings v. EPA,'55 for example, the Fifth Circuit criticized the
EPA for comparing a scenario with a ban on asbestos to a scenario with no
further regulation under TSCA-without considering an intermediate alter-
native--despite its obligation to promulgate the least burdensome regula-
tion that would adequately protect the environment.'56 To satisfy its obliga-
tion, the court found that the EPA should have evaluated the benefits and
costs of other less burdensome regulatory alternatives in its BCA.157 Other-
wise, "it is impossible, both for the EPA and for this court on review, to
know that none of these alternatives was less burdensome than the ban in
fact chosen by the agency. ' 158
Overall, this examination has revealed that courts look to the relevant
statute for cues on the permissible scope of BCA. Thus, currently, their
guidance on the appropriate scope for BCA is constrained by the statutory
language. When the statute is silent on the BCA's scope, however, courts
have encouraged comprehensive assessment of benefits and costs in some
contexts, but judicial encouragement of broadly based BCA is inconsistent.
This is partially due to the conflicting judicial norms of deferring to the
agency's judgment on scope and ensuring that the resulting analysis is ob-
jective, fair, and complete.
2. Underlying Assumptions or Methodology
Generally, a court reviews the agency's choice of model, methodolo-
gy, and assumptions in its BCA deferentially, recognizing the agency's
comparative advantage in making such technical choices. But, if the court
discovers a serious flaw in the underlying assumptions or methodology of
the analysis, it will find the agency's reliance on the questionable BCA to
be unreasonable and invalidate the resulting agency action. Table 3 de-
scribes the cases that included a challenge to the BCA's assumptions or
methodology. This Subsection focuses on the instances in which the court
found the BCA to be sufficiently flawed to warrant invalidation of the rule.
In most cases, the court defers to the agency on technical decisions.
For example, when the D.C. Circuit evaluated the EPA's proposed regula-
tions under a provision of the CWA, it rejected the National Wildlife Fed-
eration's challenge to the underlying model used in part of EPA's analysis,
stating that "[it] may reject an agency's choice of a scientific model 'only
when the model bears no rational relationship to the characteristics of the
155 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
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data to which it is applied.' That is not the case here. ' 159 Similarly, it is not
sufficient that a different assumption or methodology would have yielded a
different result, as long as the agency's method was not chosen "arbitrarily
or merely for the purpose of achieving a predetermined prejudicial ef-
fect."' 6° Other examples abound. 6 '
Sometimes, however, a statute specifically directs the agency to use
the "best available" evidence when implementing its provisions.'62 Courts
may then analyze whether the agency's underlying assumptions used to
estimate benefits or costs are "best" in light of scientific evidence.
Although not an example of a case involving judicial review of BCA,
Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA'63 is instructive in demonstrating how a
court would analyze an agency's decision to rely on a faulty modeling as-
sumption. The court invalidated the EPA's decision to set its maximum
contaminant level goal ("MCLG") for chloroform at zero, 6" a decision that
went against a growing body of scientific evidence and the agency's own
conclusion that chloroform is a threshold pollutant that poses no risks be-
low a certain level.'65 Although the MCLG is aspirational, any errors in
estimating the risk of chloroform when setting the MCLG could in turn
affect the enforceable MCL (that is based on a BCA) because the agency
has a statutory obligation to try to remain "as close to the [MCLG] as is
feasible."' 66
In City of Waukesha v. EPA, 67 the petitioners again argued that the
agency made a critical modeling mistake, this time in the context of setting
a MCLG and, based on BCA, an enforceable MCL for naturally occurring
uranium.'68 In this case, however, the court deferred to the agency's deci-
sion to employ a linear, non-threshold model for uranium risk, resulting in
an MCLG of zero.'69 The difference, according to the court, was that the
scientific data on the toxicity of uranium was contradictory, and "[t]he reso-
lution of this contradictory data [was] well within EPA's expertise."'70 Sim-
159 Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (citation omitted)
(quoting Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 135 F.3d 791, 802 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
160 Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 228 (5th Cir. 1989) (acknowledging that different
methods can produce different results), clarified on reh 'g, 885 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1989).
161 See infra Table 3.
162 See, e.g., Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(3)(A)(i) (2012).
163 206 F.3d 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
164 Id. at 1291. An MCLG of zero implies that there is no level of exposure to this contaminant that
is deemed safe. See id. at 1287.
165 Id. at 1288.
166 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-l(b)(4)(B)-(C).
167 320 F.3d 228 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
168 Id. at 231. The case also discussed the setting of a radium MCLG, but BCA was not implicated
in this discussion.
169 Id. at 252.
170 id.
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ilarly, the petitioner's challenges to the BCA-based MCL also failed as "in
the face of uncertain laboratory and epidemiological data," the court found
that "it was reasonable for EPA to take the risk-averse approach of relying
on the animal laboratory data to develop a lower standard."''
These cases suggest that, when a statute directs an agency to employ
the best-available evidence, courts are willing to review the assumptions
relevant to the agency's BCA in detail. Courts are unlikely to reject the
agency's assumptions, however, unless the agency's decision is clearly
contrary to scientific evidence.' 2 Given disagreement within the scientific
community, courts are willing to allow the agency to decide what evidence
is "best."
In most other cases, the reviewing court will even overlook minor
flaws in the agency's analysis and forgive small errors of judgment, espe-
cially when these errors do not affect the reasonableness of the agency's
overall conclusions.173 For example, in Center for Auto Safety v. Peck,'74 the
D.C. Circuit upheld as reasonable the NHTSA's BCA supporting its deci-
sion to reduce a minimum performance standard for automobile bumpers,
even though the court conceded that there was plausible disagreement on
many of the NHTSA's conclusions."' In fact, despite finding a "blatant"
error in reasoning, the court decided that "[c]onsidering the record as a
whole, [it] cannot say that this single error on an alternative point-blatant
though it may be-renders the entire rulemaking arbitrary or capricious."' 76
Ultimately, the court found that "[t]he enterprise was pursued... through a
methodology that was sensible . . . and [the NHTSA's] conclusions are
within the range of those that a reasonable person could derive from the
evidence presented."' 77 In other cases, courts have also approved agency
BCAs that rely on potentially faulty assumptions. 7 '
That said, a serious flaw in the analysis could presumably render a
BCA unreasonable."' But what kind of flaw in the assumption or method
171 Id. at 254. The court also rejected challenges to the agency's BCA that were based on a misun-
derstanding of the procedure. Id. at 255.
172 See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 507 n.20 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc) ("Indeed, a
number of the disputes involve conflicting theories and experimental results, about which it would be
judicially presumptuous to offer conclusive findings.").
173 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Herrington, 768 F.2d 1355, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
("However, we would be reluctant to seize upon a single apparently erroneous datum in a very complex
rulemaking and announce that the error undermines the entire rle... particularly when the underlying
technical issues have not, even with the benefit of supplemental briefing, been completely ventilated.").
174 751 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
175 Id. at 1370.
176 Id. at1366.
117 Id. at 1370.
178 See infra Table 3.
179 Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. EPA, 682 F.3d 1032, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ("[W]hen an
agency decides to rely on a cost-benefit analysis as part of its rulemaking, a serious flaw undermining
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would be serious enough? Or, how many minor flaws would be too many?
Again, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA is an
interesting case study as the court found numerous flaws in the EPA's
BCA. ' ° In addition to the EPA's failure to consider the costs of asbestos
substitutes or the benefits and costs of alternatives to an outright ban, the
EPA's BCA also employed flawed methodology.'81 For one, the court found
that the EPA failed to correctly discount benefits along with costs.'82 The
court also found that the EPA used an unreasonable time frame for its bene-
fits calculation.8 3 Finally, the court suspected that the EPA double counted
the costs of asbestos use.'84 It is unclear, however, if any one of these flaws
in the BCA's methodology would have been sufficient on its own to invali-
date the EPA's proposed asbestos ban.'85 A review of other cases suggests
that methodological flaws would have to combine with scope and transpar-
ency problems for a court to invalidate the rule.'86
Overall, it is not surprising that courts are particularly deferential when
reviewing an agency's BCA assumptions or methodology. Rarely was disa-
greement with an agency's choice of model, assumption, or estimate
enough to invalidate a rule, especially when there existed some evidence to
support the agency's choice.'87 In fact, in the cases where courts criticized
these aspects of the BCA, there were other problems in the agency's deci-
sion making, such as the BCA's inappropriate scope or the agency's failure
to disclose or explain important features of the analysis; often, these prob-
lems already warranted invalidation of the rule. 8'
that analysis can render the rule unreasonable." (citing City of Portland v. EPA, 507 F.3d 706, 713 (D.C.
Cir. 2007))).
180 Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1216-18 (5th Cir. 1991).
181 Id. at 1217-21.
182 Id. at 1218.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 1219.
185 Even in this case, however, the court rejected some methodological challenges against the
agency. See id. at 1229 (rejecting challenges to the EPA's decision to treat all types of asbestos the
same, the EPA's conclusion that various lengths of fibers present similar toxic risks, and the EPA's
decision that asbestos presents similar risks even in different industries and noting that "[w]hile we can,
and in this opinion do, question the agency's reliance upon flawed methodology and its failure to con-
sider factors and alternatives that TSCA explicitly requires it to consider, we do not sit as a regulatory
agency ourselves").
186 See infra Table 1.
187 See infra Tables 1, 3. We only found one case, Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety v.
FMCSA, 429 F.3d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2005), in which the court invalidated the rule after only considering
a challenge to the underlying assumptions of the BCA. Id. at 1146-47 (finding the FMCSA's assertion
that its new rule would generate a "sufficient benefit" to be nonsensical given the FMCSA's "patently
illogical" assumptions).
188 See, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. FMCSA, 374 F.3d 1209, 1216, 1218-19 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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3. Transparency
Table 4 describes transparency challenges to the agency's BCA. In
some cases, courts require the agency to provide more information about
the BCA's methodology or assumptions. By requiring such disclosure,
courts incentivize more transparent BCAs that provide notice (and an op-
portunity to comment) to those critical of the agency's decisions. In addi-
tion, increased disclosure of BCA methodologies and quantification of rele-
vant benefits and costs make it easier for courts to substantively review
BCAs. In other cases, courts require the agency to provide more infor-
mation about why it eliminated some costs, benefits, or alternatives from its
analysis.
There are a few examples of judicial requirements for more disclosure
of a BCA's methodology and assumptions. For example, the D.C. Circuit
found that the FMCSA violated the APA's requirements for notice-and-
comment rulemaking by failing to disclose the methodology of the agency's
operator-fatigue model, a crash-risk analysis that was a central component
of the justification for the final rule, thereby prejudicing the petitioner by
removing the opportunity to comment on the model.'89 Essentially, the
"complete lack of explanation for an important step in the agency's analysis
was arbitrary and capricious."' 9° Courts require disclosure even if they
would ordinarily provide great deference to the agency's decisions, but the
transparency issues must be raised before the agency prior to litigation. 9'
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Herrington92 provides an-
other example of a court requiring more disclosure of a BCA's underlying
assumptions. The D.C. Circuit analyzed the DOE's use of a real annual
discount rate of 10 percent when determining life cycle costs and the net
present value of savings from appliance energy efficiency standards.' The
court rejected the DOE's choice of discount rate "as fatally unexplained" in
light of its major consequences for the estimation of benefits and costs.'94
Interestingly, the fact that the agency used the OIRA's recommended dis-
189 Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n v. FMCSA, 494 F.3d 188, 199-202 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
That said, petitioner must provide some indication of what it would challenge about the methodology
and that the challenge, if successful, may change the benefit-cost balance. See City of Waukesha v.
EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 246-47 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
190 Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers, 494 F.3d at 204.
191 See Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("[W]e must be implac-
ably skeptical of belated recognition at the appellate stage that elements of scientific analysis unchal-
lenged during a contested proceeding are incomprehensible without further explanation. To credit such
post-appeal pleas of inadequate information is to threaten the integrity of all rulemaking in fields beyond
our own limited scientific ken.").
192 768 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
193 Id. at 1412-14.
194 Id. at 1414.
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count rate was not deemed to be a sufficient explanation.195 In addition to a
lack of information about the chosen discount rate, the court found other
deficiencies in the agency's explanation of its assumptions.' For example,
the court requested more information on the origin of certain statistics un-
derlying benefit estimates,' as well as on the assumptions behind the agen-
cy's use of a specific model to estimate certain costs. 198
Judicially imposed requirements for more explanation and more quan-
tification could serve two goals. First, these requirements would increase
BCA transparency for the public, allowing those potentially critical of BCA
an opportunity to contact the agency about the scope, methodology, or as-
sumptions in the BCA before the final rulemaking. Second, these require-
ments would enhance the ability of courts to meaningfully review BCA
going forward. 199 This rationale could explain why courts have pushed
agencies to explain, quantify, and monetize the most important effects."'
IV. AGENCY BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS AS EVIDENCE
As discussed previously, Executive Order 12,866 requires an agency
to prepare a BCA for all significant rules-even if the agency is ultimately
not required to, and does not, rely on the BCA when implementing the rele-
vant statutory provision.2 1 The BCA still becomes part of the record before
the agency (and, ultimately, the court). If the court finds the BCA to be
persuasive, it may use the BCA as evidence in support of or, more typically,
against the agency's decision. In this variation, the BCA is not directly
challenged, but the court indirectly reviews the BCA to determine its per-
suasiveness in support of or against the agency's position. Table 5 describes
cases in which the BCA was used as evidence.
Although we identified instances in which a court used a BCA to sup-
port agency action, there are more examples of courts using the agency's
BCA against the agency.2 2 For example, in R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.
195 Id. at 1413.
196 Id. at 1413-14.
197 Id. at 1419.
198 Natural Res. Def. Council, 768 F.2d at 1419-22.
199 See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1219 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Such [reliance on
unquantified benefits to justify regulation] not only lessen[s] the value of the EPA's cost analysis, but
also make[s] any meaningful judicial review impossible.").
200 See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Chamber of
Commerce of the U.S. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143-45 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
201 Technically, the executive order says an agency must rely on BCA if allowed to do so, but
ultimately this is not a judicially enforceable requirement.
202 See infra Table 5.
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FDA,"3 the D.C. Circuit found that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") did not provide substantial evidence that graphic warnings on cig-
arette advertising would directly advance its interest in reducing smoking
rates to a material degree .21 As mandatory graphic warnings were a type of
limit on commercial speech, the court applied an intermediate level of scru-
tiny, evaluating whether the agency's means were narrowly tailored to
achieve a substantial government goal.2 °5 The court used the agency's own
BCA to support its determination that graphic warnings would not directly
advance the asserted government interest to a material degree. 26 The FDA's
regulatory impact analysis drew on two types of evidence regarding the
likely effect of graphic health warnings on smoking prevalence rates-
survey data regarding how consumers perceived different kinds of possible
graphic health warnings and a statistical analysis of the effect of the graphic
health warnings on smoking prevalence rates in Canada.27 The main focus
was on the Canadian experience, as that embodied the effect of an actual
graphic health warnings "experiment" in a country quite similar to the
United States.2°5 In each case, the FDA did not find any statistically signifi-
cant evidence of the efficacy of the graphic warnings. 9 The court conclud-
203 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
204 Id. at 1217-19. One of the authors served as an industry expert on this matter. See Comments of
W. Kip Viscusi, Professor, Vanderbilt University, at the request of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company,
Lorillard Tobacco Company, and Commonwealth Brands, Inc., for U.S. Food and Drug Administration
Docket No. FDA-2010o-N-0568, RIN-0910-AG41, Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages & Adver-
tisements (Jan. 11,2011).
205 In 2014, the D.C. Circuit overruled part of the case that limited application of rational basis
review to narrow circumstances. Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 22-23. This perceived limitation on the
application of rational basis review led the court in R.J. Reynolds to apply the stricter intermediate
scrutiny.
206 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 696 F.3d at 1219-21.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Some scholars, however, argue that these studies provided sufficient evidence of the effective-
ness of graphic warnings and have suggested that the decision was a reflection of the emergence of new
libertarian administrative law. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative
Law 22 (Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 14-29, 2014), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=2460822 ("The FDA's evidence, coming largely from reductions in smoking after graphic
warnings were required in Canada, did involve inferences .... But... the inferences were very much of
the kind that lie at the core of administrators' competence."). However, a careful review of the FDA's
analysis and the R.J Reynolds decision indicates that the court had a thorough understanding of the
components of the FDA analysis and its implications, which were less favorable to the rule than
Sunstein and Vermeule suggest. The FDA could not reject the statistical hypothesis of a zero effect. The
FDA's point estimate of the effect of graphic warnings on smoking prevalence rates was 0.088 percent-
age points, or less than one-tenth of one percentage point, and the small effect lacked statistical signifi-
cance. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 36,721,
36,724, 36,6756, 36,775-76 (June 22, 2011). The decision in R.J Reynolds reviewed the Canadian data
in considerable detail and noted that the FDA also concluded that it found that the effects of graphic
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ed, the "FDA has not provided a shred of evidence-much less the 'sub-
stantial evidence' required by the APA-showing that the graphic warnings
will 'directly advance' its interest in reducing the number of Americans
who smoke. 21  The court's ruling is quite consistent with the statistical
evidence presented by the FDA. As with the other cases discussed above,
there appears to be no apparent inability of the court to either understand or
properly assess the agency's BCA.
In addition, courts have referred to a prior BCA in order to disapprove
of the final rule (which was not as stringent as the prior BCA suggested
would be necessary)."' A BCA could also demonstrate the feasibility or
desirability of alternative or additional interventions.
V. THE FUTURE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The analysis in Parts II, III, and IV has generated several observations
about the state of judicial review of BCA. First, it is clear that the statutory
language is key, both in clarifying whether BCA is permissible and in out-
lining the scope and depth of adequate BCA. But, as with other matters,
courts may disagree on the meaning of the statutory language and provide
inconsistent directions on permissible BCA. The importance of statutory
language also makes clear that any congressional enactments that would
increase the permissibility of agency reliance on BCA may also have an
effect on the nature of the required analysis.
In the absence of specific statutory language outlining the scope of an
agency's BCA, courts generally evaluate whether the BCAs include all
relevant aspects of the problem, ensuring that entire categories of benefits
or costs are not omitted from the analysis. Courts are also increasingly re-
quiring agencies to quantify benefits and costs to the extent possible. The
standard of what is an acceptable BCA may change over time as courts
become more comfortable evaluating the analyses and as conducting high-
quality BCA becomes more feasible. Today, sophisticated agency BCA is
possible given advances in methodologies and modeling. Whereas previ-
ously, courts may have been sympathetic to the agency's difficult chal-
lenge-forgiving even obvious flaws-the courts may now expect high-
warnings were "in general not statistically distinguishable from zero." R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696
F.3d at 1220 (quoting Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at
36,776) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court noted that "FDA could not even reject the statisti-
cal possibility that the Rule would have no impact on U.S. smoking rates." Id.
210 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1219.
211 Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety v. FMCSA, 429 F.3d 1136, 1145-46 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
212 See Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Mineta, 340 F.3d 39, 58 (2d Cir. 2003) (using the BCA to demonstrate
that a more cost-effective alternative exists); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1258,
1289 (1st Cir. 1987) (rejecting as unreasonable the agency's decision not to implement in the final rule
cheap ways of increasing protections identified in the BCA).
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quality BCAs. Given what is possible today, it might be unreasonable for an
agency to rely on a low-quality BCA.
This Article's analysis has also revealed some prominent virtues of ju-
dicial review of agency BCA. A robust judicial review provides another
check on agency BCA and catches some errors not addressed by the OIRA
because of an oversight or political expediency. Judicial review could thus
prevent some abuses of the use of BCA. Courts have also encouraged agen-
cies to provide detailed explanations of the underlying methodology and to
quantify as many effects as possible, making BCA more transparent to the
public and allowing for more meaningful review going forward."3 Finally,
our review of thirty-eight cases involving BCA does not demonstrate any
inability of the courts to grasp the economic issues, despite the judges' pro-
fessed lack of expertise. The regulatory impact analysis and evidence pre-
sented at trial would provide the courts with a substantive basis for assess-
ment in much the same way as regulatory decisions are made by the direc-
tor of the OIRA, who typically has been an attorney without doctoral train-
ing in economics.
On the other hand, judicial review does not ensure consistency in
methodology or assumptions within one rulemaking in one agency, much
less across rulemakings or across agencies. Courts only review BCAs of
challenged rulemakings that rely on BCA-unlike the OIRA, which re-
views BCAs for all significant rulemakings. Courts also vary in their levels
of comfort with evaluating complex and technical documents.
In addition, stringent judicial review may impose significant costs on
agencies and further delay rulemakings. When a court invalidates a rule
based on reliance on a faulty BCA, the world returns to the pre-rule status
quo-which may be a less welfare-enhancing scenario. By the time the
agency corrects the BCA to the court's satisfaction, years may have passed.
For example, it took more than ten years and multiple rounds of litigation
for the court to approve the FMCSA's regulations on hours of service for
commercial drivers.2"4 In that case, Congress actually enshrined the origi-
nally invalidated rule until the FMCSA could promulgate a new rule that
satisfied the court."1 5 However, Congress is unlikely to act so quickly in the
case of other invalidated rules.
As Congress continues to consider proposed legislation to expand
agency BCA requirements, it is especially important to evaluate how such
legislation would affect judicial review. Commonly proposed bills require
agencies to conduct BCA sometimes without demanding any particular
result. If BCA statutory requirements are procedural, then courts could still
213 See infra Tables 3, 4.
214 See Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. FMCSA, 724 F.3d 243, 251 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 914 (2014); Pub. Citizen v. FMCSA, 374 F.3d 1209, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2004), rev'd sub nom. Owner-
Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n v. FMCSA, 494 F.3d 188, 206 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
215 See Am. Trucking Ass 'ns, 724 F.3d at 245-46 (describing the saga).
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inquire into the adequacy of the BCA as they do with environmental impact
statement ("EIS") requirements under the National Environmental Policy
Act ("NEPA").1 6 Or, a proposed bill may encourage agencies to promul-
gate rules that pass a benefit-cost test, but only to the extent permissible by
law. This type of requirement would essentially codify the existing execu-
tive order and create more opportunities for courts to review agency BCA
as they do now.
But, Congress could also enact a supermandate provision that might
override an agency's current mandate. The provision could either permit
agencies to base policies on BCA ("soft" supermandate) or require agencies
to base policies on a benefit-cost test ("hard" supermandate), notwithstand-
ing potentially contrary statutory prohibitions.1 7 Permitting BCA in all cas-
es would also have some effect in bolstering the role of the judiciary, as
specifically framed statutory guidance would no longer be binding. If, how-
ever, the agency's policies were required to pass a benefit-cost test, then the
role of judicial review would be greatly expanded unless the enacted laws
explicitly limit judicial review.
If judicial review were allowed, courts would not usurp the role of the
OIRA but could provide a check on regulatory policies that were not appro-
priately screened out by the executive branch's regulatory oversight pro-
cess, as in the case of the FDA's proposed graphic warnings regulation.1 8
In addition, with BCA-based decision making directly required by Con-
gress, courts may be more likely to engage in a strict review along the lines
of the judicial review in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA.219
Proper assessment of whether there should be an expanded role of the
judiciary requires a comprehensive BCA of its own. What is the extent of
the regulatory failures that need to be fixed? To what extent is an expanded
regulatory oversight effort either unable or unlikely to be able to address
these problems? And, if judicial review is enhanced, would the principal
effect be to overturn regulations that are not in society's best interests, or
would it delay or overturn beneficial regulations? The answers to these
questions often hinge on the specific nature of the regulatory reform legisla-
tion.
CONCLUSION
This Article has evaluated how courts review agency BCAs. It has dis-
cussed the conditions that trigger judicial review of agency BCAs and the
216 See discussion supra note 93.
217 See Sunstein, supra note 90, at 270.
218 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1219-20 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in
part by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cit. 2014) (en banc).
219 Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1213-14 & n.13 (5th Cir. 1991).
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standards that govern the review. Against this backdrop, it presented specif-
ic examples of how courts analyze BCAs. It found that courts are most
comfortable evaluating BCAs in light of statutory guidance. That said,
courts have been willing to question BCA methodology and assumptions,
and request more transparency on these issues. In addition, BCAs prepared
pursuant to executive order can be used against the agency in certain situa-
tions, even if the agency does not and need not rely on the BCA. The per-
formance of the courts has been sufficiently competent that entrusting
greater responsibility to courts may be beneficial. There is no evidence of
courts overstepping their proper scope of authority in this area.
As agencies rely more on BCA in their decision making, judicial re-
view of BCA will be increasingly important. The legitimate institutional
actors with respect to regulatory policies include the judiciary as well as
Congress and the executive branch. To the extent that the BCA is the pivot-
al summary of the merits of these policies, engaging with regulatory policy
also necessitates some engagement with BCA. The stakes are high. Addi-
tional judicial oversight can be valuable-but bolstering any oversight ef-
fort to provide a policy check can also impose societal costs if desirable
policies are delayed or left unimplemented. Ideally, efforts to foster greater
judicial review should be structured so that the enhanced role of the judici-
ary itself passes a benefit-cost test.
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Table 1. Judicial Review of BCA Sample
At Least Analyzed Analyzed
Some Analyzed BCA BCA Used
Disapprov- BCA Assump- Transpar- BCA as
Case Name Agency al of BCA Scope? tions? ency? Evidence
Advocates for FMCSA YES YES YES
Highway & Auto
Safety v. FMCSA,
429 F.3d 1136 (D.C.
Cir. 2005)
Alabama Power Co. OSHA NO** YES
v. OSHA, 89 F.3d
740 (11 th Cir. 1996)
Am. Min. Cong. v. EPA NO YES YES YES
Thomas, 772 F.2d
617 (10th Cir. 1985)
Am. Trucking FMCSA NO YES YES
Ass'ns v. FMCSA,
724 F.3d 243 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct.
914 (2014)
Arizona Cattle FWS NO YES
Growers' Ass'n v.
Salazar, 606 F.3d
1160 (9th Cir. 2010)
Bus. Roundtable v. SEC YES YES YES
SEC, 647 F.3d 1144
(D.C. Cir. 2011)_
Chamber of Com- SEC YES YES
merce of the U.S. v.
SEC, 412 F.3d 133
(D.C. Cir. 2005)
Charter Commc'ns FCC NO YES
v. FCC, 460 F.3d 31
(D.C. Cir. 2006)
Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n EPA NO YES YES
v, EPA, 870 F.2d
177, decision clari-
fied on reh"g, 885
F.2d 253 (5th Cir.
1989)
City of Waukesha v. EPA NO YES YES
EPA, 320 F.3d 228
(D.C. Cir. 2003)
Competitive Enter. NHTSA NO YES
Inst. v. NHTSA, 901
F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir.
1990)
Competitive Enter.
Inst. v. NHTSA, 956
F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir.
.1A !-992) .. .. ....
Consumer Electron-
ics Ass'n v. FCC,
347 F.3d 291 (D.C.
Cir. 2003)
Corrosion Proof
Fittings v. EPA, 947
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At Least Analyzed Analyzed
Some Analyzed BCA BCA Used
Disapprov- BCA Assump- Transpar- BCA as
Case Name Agency al of BCA Scope? tions? ency? Evidence
Ctr. for Auto Safety NHTSA NO YES YES
v. Peck, 751 F.2d
1336 (D.C. Cir.
1985)-._
Ctr. for Biological NHTSA YES YES YES
Diversity v.
NHTSA, 538 F.3d
1172 (9th Cir. 2008)
Florida Manufac- HUD NO YES
tured Hous. Ass'n v.
Cisneros, 53 F.3d
1565 (1 lth Cir.
1995)
Gas Appliance Mfrs. DOE YES YES YES YES YES
Ass'n v. DOE, 998
F.2d 1041 (D.C. Cir.
1993)
Inv. Co. Inst. v. CFTC NO YES
CFTC, 720 F.3d 370
(D.C. Cir. 2013)
N. California Power FERC NO YES
Agency v. FERC, 37
F.3d 1517 (D.C. Cir.
1994)Nat'l Truck Equip. NHTSA NO YES
Ass'n v. NHTSA,
711 F.3d 662 (6th
Cir. 2013)
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n EPA NO YES YES
v. EPA, 286 F.3d
554 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
supplemented sub
nom. In re Kagan,
351 F.3d 1157 (D.C.
Cir. 2003)
Natural Res. Def. EPA YES YES
Council, Inc. v.
EPA, 824 F.2d 1258
(lst Cit. 1987)





New Mexico Cattle FWS YES YES
Growers Ass'n v.
FWS, 248 F.3d 1277
(10th Cir. 2001)
Nw. Envtl. Advo- USACE NO YES
cates v. NMFS, 460
F.3d 1125 (9th Cir.
2006)
Owner-Operator FMCSA YES YES YES
Indep. Drivers Ass'n
v. FMCSA, 494 F.3d
188 (D.C. Cit. 2007)
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At Least Analyzed Analyzed
Some Analyzed BCA BCA Used
Disapprov- BCA Assump- Transpar- BCA as
Case Name Agency al of BCA Scope? tions? ency? Evidence
Owner-Operator FMCSA YES YES
Indep. Drivers Ass'n
v. FMCSA, 656 F.3d
580 (7th Cir. 2011









Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. NHTSA YES YES
Mineta, 340 F.3d 39
(2d Cir. 2003)
Quivira Min. Co. v. NRC NO YES
NRC, 866 F.2d 1246
(10th Cir. 1989)
R.J. Reynolds To- FDA NO* YES
bacco Co. v. FDA,
696 F.3d 1205 (D.C.
Cir. 2012), over-
ruled in part by Am.
Meat Inst. v. USDA,
760 F.3d 18 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) en bane)
Radio Ass'n on FHWA NO YES YES YES
Defending Airwave
Rights, Inc. v. DOT,
47 F.3d 794 (6th Cir.
1995)
Reynolds Metals Co. EPA NO YES YES
v. EPA, 760 F.2d
549 (4th Cir. 1985)
State of La., ex rel. NMFS NO YES
Guste v. Verity, 853
F.2d 322 (5th Cir.
1988)
State of N.Y. v. EPA YES YES YES
Reilly, 969 F.2d
1147 (D.C. Cir.
Webster v. USDA, NRCS NO YES YES
685 F.3d 411 (4th
Cir. 2012)
Notes: The default standard of review is the APA's arbitrary or capricious standard, but * denotes use of
substantial evidence standard that most courts recognize as equivalent to the arbitrary or capricious
standard and ** denotes use of a stringent substantial evidence standard explicitly determined by the
reviewing court to be stricter than the arbitrary or capricious standard. Agency names are replaced by
acronyms. For information about these cases, see discussion Part HII.
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Table 2. Challenges to BCA's Scope
Case Name Challenge Relevant to BCA Scope Challenge Examples
Alabama Power Co. v. Challenge to standard addressing Challenge to BCA as failing to
OSHA, 89 F.3d 740 clothing requirements for employees consider costs, but court upheld
(11 th Cir. 1996) who may be exposed to flames or agency determination that requiring
electric arcs employees to wear flame-resistant
clothing had negligible cost
Am. Min. Cong. v. Challenge to standards for the Challenge to rigor of BCA, but court
Thomas, 772 F.2d 617 cleanup and disposal of uranium determined that Congress intended a
(10th Cir. 1985) mill tailings originating from desig- less strict BCA in this case
nated inactive mill sites
Arizona Cattle Grow- Challenge to critical habitat designa- Court determined that the baseline
ers' Ass'n v. Salazar, tion for Mexican-spotted owl approach for determining benefits
606 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. and costs of critical habitat designa-
2010) tion was permissible
Bus. Roundtable v. Challenge to rule requiring compa- Court determined that agency BCA
SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 nies to provide information to was missing too many categories of
(D.C. Cir. 2011) shareholders on voting rights benefits and costs to be sufficient
Chamber of Commerce Challenge to rule setting conditions Court determined that agency BCA
of the U.S. v. SEC, 412 under which a mutual fund could failed to adequately consider costs
F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. engage in certain otherwise prohib- and failed to consider an important
2005) ited transactions alternative
Charter Commc'ns v. Challenge to refusal to rescind rule Challenge to rigor of BCA, but
FCC, 460 F.3d 31 prohibiting certain offerings by informal, qualitative BCA was
(D.C. Cir. 2006) cable television operators deemed adequate
City of Waukesha v. Challenge to BCA of rule setting Court determined that agency did not
EPA, 320 F.3d 228 limits on naturally occurring urani- need to include costs and benefits of
(D.C. Cir. 2003) um in public water systems other rules in BCA per statute
Competitive Enter. Challenge to rule establishing corpo- Court allowed agency to ignore
Inst. v. NHTSA, 901 rate average fuel economy standards safety concerns in BCA at this time
F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir.
1990)
Competitive Enter. Challenge to decision to not lower Court determined that agency should
Inst. v. NHTSA, 956 corporate average fuel economy have seriously analyzed safety
F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. standards concerns in BCA given the higher
1992) standards imposed
Consumer Electronics Challenge to rule requiring certain Court determined that the assess-
Ass'n v. FCC, 347 F.3d televisions to include specific tuner ment of costs was unreasonable
291 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
Corrosion Proof Fit- Challenge to rule banning asbestos Court determined that BCA did not
tings v. EPA, 947 F.2d in almost all products quantify important benefits, did not
1201 (5th Cir. 1991). consider costs of substitutes, and did
not consider any reasonable alterna-
tives to ban
Ctr. for Biological Challenge to rule setting corporate Court determined that BCA failed to
Diversity v. NHTSA, average fuel economy standards for monetize greenhouse gas emissions
538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. light trucks reductions despite evidence
2008)
Gas Appliance Mfrs.
Ass'n v. DOE, 998
F.2d 1041 (D.C. Cir.
1993)
Inv. Co. Inst. v. CFTC,
720 F.3d 370 (D.C.
Cir. 2013)
Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. Her-
rington, 768 F.2d 1355
(D.C. Cir. 1985)
Challenge to standby-loss rule
affecting water heaters installed in
new federal construction projects
Challenge to rule adopting height-
ened disclosure requirements
Challenge to rules determining that
mandatory energy-efficiency stand-
ards were not justified for eight
types of household appliances
Court determined that the BCA
failed to adequately consider costs
and was not structured as a "coherent
marginal analysis"
Challenge to rigor of BCA, but court
determined that Congress intended a
less strict BCA in this case
Court determined that BCA's con-
sideration of alternatives was too
- limited
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FWS, 248 F.3d 1277
(10th Cir. 2001)
Challenge Relevant to BCA
Challenge to the critical habitat
designation for the southwestern
willow flycatcher
Scope Challenge Examples ,
Court determined that baseline
approach in BCA was not permissi-
ble
Nw. Envtl. Advocates Challenge to the adequacy of EIS Court determined scope and consid-
v. NMFS, 460 F.3d and BCA used in project to deepen eration of benefits and costs was
1125 (9th Cir. 2006) Columbia River navigation channel adequate, despite lively dissent
and to propose new sites for dispos-
. .al of dredged materials
Owner-Operator Indep. Challenge to rule establishing hours Court determined that BCA's con-
Drivers Ass'n v. of service for long-haul truck drivers sideration of statutorily mandated
FMCSA, 494 F.3d 188 factors was sufficient
_(DC. Cir. 2007 _
Owner-Operator Indep. Challenge to rule on the use of Court determined that BCA did not
Drivers Ass'n v. electronic monitoring devices in consider statutorily mandated factor
FMCSA, 656 F.3d 580 commercial trucks (potential for driver harassment)
(7th Cir. 2011)
Pub. Citizen Health Challenge to rule establishing long- Court determined that -agency should
Research Grp. v. Ty- term exposure limit for ethylene have considered short-term exposure
son, 796 F.2d 1479 oxide and to decision not to set a limit in its rule
(D.C. Cir. 1986) short-term exposure limit on eth-
ylene oxide
Pub. Citizen v. Challenge to rule revising hours of Court determined that BCA did not
FMCSA, 374 F.3d service for driving and work of consider statutorily mandated factor
1209 (D.C. Cir. 2004) commercial drivers (impact of rule on driver health) and
failed to consider other important
benefits and costs
Quivira Min. Co. v, Challenge to rule establishing stand- Challenge to rigor of BCA, but court
NRC, 866 F.2d 1246 ards for licensing and relicensing determined that Congress intended a
(10th Cir. 1989) uranium mills and uranium mill less strict BCA in this case
tailings sites
Radio Ass'n on De- Challenge to rule prohibiting use of Court determined that agency did not
fending Airwave radar detectors in commercial motor need to consider effects on speed
Rights, Inc. v. DOT, 47 vehicles variance or costs of state enforce-
F.3d 794 (6th Cir. ment
1995)
Reynolds Metals Co. v. Challenge to rule limiting effluent Court determined that analysis of
EPA, 760 F.2d 549 for can-making industry incremental costs was permissible
(4th Cir. 1985) and adequate
State of N.Y. v. Reilly, Challenge to decision not to prom- Court determined that agency should
969 F.2d 1147 (D.C. ulgate two provisions (waste separa- have considered alternatives to ban
Cir. 1992) tion provision and a ban on lead- on battery buming in its BCA before
acid vehicle battery combustion) determining action to be cost prohib-
itive
Webster v. USDA, 685 Challenge to dam construction Court determined that BCA could
F.3d 411 (4th Cir. consider benefits and costs of project
2012) as a whole and could consider bene-
fits that are incidental to the agen-
cy's purpose
Notes: The table does not necessarily summarize all relevant challenges. For information about these
cases, see discussion Part III.
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Table 3. Challenges to BCA's Methodology or Assumptions
Case Name Challenge Relevant to BCA
Advocates for Highway & Challenge to rule implement-
Auto Safety v. FMCSA, 429 ing entry-level training re-
F.3d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2005) quirements for drivers of
commercial vehicles
Methodology and Assumptions Chal-
lenge Examples
Court determined that underlying
studies did not support benefit calcu-
lation under rule
Am. Min. Cong. v. Thomas, Challenge to standards for the Court upheld BCA despite conserva-
772 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. cleanup and disposal of urani- tive and inaccurate assumptions that
1985) um mill tailings originating may have overestimated benefits
from designated inactive mill
sites
Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Challenge to safety-oriented Court determined that agency's as-
FMCSA, 724 F.3d 243 provisions of hours-of-service sumptions and extrapolations in BCA
(D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. rule for commercial drivers were reasonably based on reliable
denied, 134 S. Ct. 914 evidence
(2014)
Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, Challenge to rule requiring Court determined that agency relied
647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. companies to provide infor- on insufficient empirical data when it
2011) mation to shareholders on considered the benefits
voting rights
Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, Challenge to rule limiting Court rejected multiple challenges to
870 F.2d 177, decision discharge of waterbome the agency's statistical and analytical
clarifiedon reh 'g, 885 F.2d pollutants methodology in BCA
253 (5th Cir. 1989)
City of Waukesha v. EPA, Challenge to BCA of rule Challenges to underlying studies, but
320 F.3d 228 (D.C. Cir. setting limits on naturally court determined that the agency
2003) occurring uranium in public could take risk-averse approach where
water systems epidemiological data is uncertain
Consumer Electronics Ass'n Challenge to rule requiring Court upheld agency decision to
v. FCC, 347 F.3d 291 (D.C. certain televisions to include eliminate some upper and lower
Cir. 2003) specitic tuner estimates of cost in its BCA
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Challenge to rule banning Court rejected various aspects of
EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th asbestos in almost all products BCA's methodology and assumptions
Cir. 1991).
Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck, Challenge to rule reducing Challenges to assumptions in BCA,
751 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. minimum performance stand- but court rejected most of these
1985) ard for automobile bumpers
Ctr. for Biological Diversity Challenge to rule setting Court determined that challenged
v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172 corporate average fuel econ- assumption in BCA was not so im-
(9th Cir. 2008) omy standards for light trucks plausible that it could not be ascribed
to a difference in view or a product of
agency expertise
Florida Manufactured Hous. Challenge to strengthened Court rejected challenges to the
Ass'n v. Cisneros, 53 F.3d wind-resistance standards for underlying data and methodology
1565 (11 th Cir. 1995) manufactured homes used to calculate benefits and costs
Gas Appliance Mfrs. Ass'n Challenge to standby-loss rule Court determined that the underlying
v. DOE, 998 F.2d 1041 affecting water heaters in- computer modeling was faulty and the
(D.C. Cir. 1993) stalled in new federal con- multiplier for projecting costs was
struction projects arbitrary, among other things
N. California Power Agency Challenge to net-benefits Court rejected the challenge to the
v. FERC, 37 F.3d 1517 calculation in a electric utility discount rate used to calculate net
(D.C. Cir. 1994) hydroelectric projects reli- benefits
censing proceeding
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Challenge to regulations Court rejected the challenge to the
EPA, 286 F.3d 554 (D.C. concerning effluent from model predicting bankruptcies used to
Cir. 2002), supplemented bleached "papergrade kraft" estimate costs
sub nom. In re Kagan, 351 subcategory of pulp and paper
F.3d 1157 (D.C. Cir. 2003) mill processes
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Case Name
Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc. v. Herrington, 768 F.2d
1355 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
Pub. Citizen Health Re-
search Grp. v. Tyson, 796
F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
Challenge Relevant to BCA
Challenge to rules determin-
ing that mandatory energy-
efficiency standards were not
justified for eight types of
household appliances
Challenge to rule establishing
long-term exposure limit for
ethylene oxide and to decision
not to set a short-term expo-
sure limit on ethylene oxide
Methodology and Assumptions Chal-
lenge Examples
Court rejected challenges to underly-
ing model and discount rate in BCA
Court determined that the cumulative
impact of underlying studies support-
ed BCA assumptions
Pub. Citizen v. FMCSA, Challenge to rule revising Court listed several problematic
374 F.3d 1209 (D.C. Cir. hours of service for driving assumptions in BCA, such as the
2004) and work of commercial assumption that time spent driving is
drivers equally as fatiguing as time spent
resting, after rejecting rule based on
inadequate scope
Radio Ass'n on Defending Challenge to nule prohibiting Court found BCA assumptions were
Airwave Rights, Inc. v. use of radar detectors in adequately supported as reasonable
DOT, 47 F.3d 794 (6th Cir. commercial motor vehicles decisions in light of uncertain data
Reynolds Metals Co. v. Challenge to rule limiting After rejecting most challenges to
EPA, 760 F.2d 549 (4th Cir. effluent for can-making indus- assumptions and methodology, the
1985) try court acknowledged one possible
error but declined to reverse on that
g'ound
State of La., ex rel. Guste v. Challenge to regulations on Court rejected a challenge to the
Verity, 853 F.2d 322 (5th shrimping industry meant to underlying data connecting the
Cir. 1988) protect sea turtles shrimping industry to turtle mortality
(although BCA may not have been
dispositive in this case)
State of N.Y. v. Reilly, 969 Challenge to decision not to Court rejected challenges to the
F.2d 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1992) promulgate two provisions sufficiency of evidence and the worst-
(waste separation provision case scenario methodology in analysis
and a ban on lead-acid vehicle
.. .USDA, 685F.3d _battery com!bustion)
Webster v. USDA, 685 F.3d Challenge to dam construction Court upheld agency's use of a high-
411 (4th Cir. 2012) end estimate in its benefits calculation
as within reasonable range
Notes: The table does not necessarily summarize all relevant challenges. For information about these
cases, see discussion Part Ill.
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Table 4. Challenges to BCA's Transparency
Case Name Challenge Relevant to BCA Transparency Challenge Examples
Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Challenge to safety-oriented Court determined that BCA required
FMCSA, 724 F.3d 243 (D.C. provisions of hours-of-service explanation of decision to apply 30-
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 rule for commercial drivers minute break to short-haul drivers
S. Ct. 914 (2014)
Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, Challenge to rule limiting Although underlying studies and data
870 F.2d 177, decision discharge of waterbome should be disclosed to the public,
clarified on reh "g, 885 F.2d pollutants court declined to overturn the regula-
253 (5th Cir. 1989) tion on this ground in these circum-
stances
Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck, Challenge to rule reducing Although methodology should be
751 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. minimum performance stand- disclosed, court refused to consider
1985) ard for automobile bumpers such a challenge when first made on
appeal and determined methodology
to be part of a common ground of
knowledge
Gas Appliance Mfrs. Ass'n Challenge to standby-loss rule Court determined that cost multiplier
v. DOE, 998 F.2d 1041 affecting water heaters in- was arbitrary partly because the
(D.C. Cir. 1993) stalled in new federal con- reasoning behind its application to
struction projects larger commercial market was unex-
plained
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. EPA, Challenge to regulations Court found the BCA's methodology
286 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. concerning effluent from to be adequately explained
2002), supplemented sub bleached "papergrade kraft"
nom. In re Kagan, 351 F.3d subcategory of pulp and paper
1157 (D.C. Cir. 2003) mill processes
Natural Res. Def. Council, Challenge to rules determin- Court encouraged agency to provide
Inc. v. Herrington, 768 F.2d ing that mandatory energy- more explanation behind its choice of
1355 (D.C. Cir. 1985) efficiency standards were not discount rate and more information
justified for eight types of on its cost model assumptions
household appliances.......... ...  ...........  ........ .... ............. -........... -1  ............. o_- -o- .~e ... .  . ... ......  ..... - .. .......................................... .... .... . .... .... . .... . .... . ..
Owner-Operator Indep. Challenge to rule establishing Court found that agency failed to
Drivers Ass'n v. FMCSA, hours of service for long-haul disclose methodology used to get
494 F.3d 188 (D.C. Cir. truck drivers estimates and multipliers in model
2007)_. used in BCA
Pub. Citizen Health Research Challenge to rule establishing Court determined that agency did not
Grp. v. Tyson, 796 F.2d long-term exposure limit for sufficiently explain decision not to
1479 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ethylene oxide and to decision adopt a short-term exposure limit
not to set a short-term expo-
sure limit on ethylene oxide
Radio Ass'n on Defending Challenge to rule prohibiting Court found that the speeding num-
Airwave Rights, Inc. v. use of radar detectors in bers in the BCA were sufficiently
DOT, 47 F.3d 794 (6th Cir. commercial motor vehicles explained
1995)
Notes: The table does not necessarily summarize all relevant challenges. For information about these
cases, see discussion Part II.
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Table 5. Court Use of BCA as Evidence
Case Name Challenge Relevant to BCA BCA-as-Evidence Examples
Advocates for Highway & Challenge to rule implement- Court determined that agency ignored
Auto Safety v. FMCSA, 429 ing entry-level training re- its previous BCA discussing the
F.3d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2005) quirements for drivers of importance of adequate training to
commercial vehicles the calculation of benefits
Am. Min. Cong. v. Thomas, Challenge to standards for the Court used some figures from the EIS
772 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. cleanup and disposal of urani- as evidence cutting against the rule's
1985) um mill tailings originating estimate of benefits
from designated inactive mill
sites
Gas Appliance Mfrs. Ass'n Challenge to standby-loss rule Court found that statute required
v. DOE, 998 F.2d 1041 affecting water heaters in- BCA, and agency had not identified
(D.C. Cir. 1993) stalled in new federal con- any basis for disregarding the out-
struction projects come of its BCA and imposing a
standard that fails the benefit-cost test
Nat'l Truck Equip. Ass'n v. Challenge to federal motor Although executive order require-
NHTSA, 711 F.3d 662 (6th vehicle safety standard ments are not judicially enforced,
Cir. 2013) court commented that agency's
inference based on the BCA's find-
ings was reasonable
Natural Res. Def. Council, Challenge to standards for Court used agency's BCA to support
Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1258 long-term disposal of high- conclusion that agency could have
(lst Cir. 1987) level radioactive waste chosen better sites
Pub. Citizen Health Re- Challenge to rule establishing Although agency abandoned the
search Grp. v. Tyson, 796 long-term exposure limit for short-term exposure limit likely due
F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ethylene oxide and to decision to OMB's encouragement given the
not to set a short-term expo- BCA, court found agency's refusal to
sure limit on ethylene oxide adopt the short-term exposure limit
unexlained
Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Mineta, Challenge to rule regulating Court used the BCA against agency,
340 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2003) installation of tire pressure finding that the rejected option was
monitoring systems in new more cost-effective; on the other
motor vehicles hand, court found support for other
- .o.to. . . .. agency decisions in the BCA
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. Challenge to rule requiring Court used agency's BCA to find that
v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 display of new textual wam- the rule would not advance the gov-
(D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled ings and graphic images on emient's interest in reducing smok-
in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. cigarette packaging ing to a material degree
USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (en banc)
Notes: The table does not necessarily summarize all relevant challenges. For information about these
cases, see discussion Part IV.

